

**Inaugural Conference EPSSE**

**European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions**

**Book of Abstracts**





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Instituto de Filosofia da Nova,

FCSH – Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa Portugal

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**Inaugural Conference EPSSE**

**European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions**

Welcome to the Inaugural Conference

Emotions punctuate almost all the significant events in our lives, but the nature, causes, and consequences of the emotions are among the least well understood aspects of human experience. In recent decades there has arisen a significantly greater interest in the study of emotions by scholars in various fields. Such an interdisciplinary interest and interaction are crucial for the understanding of emotions. Nevertheless, we believe that there is room for more intensive discussions among scholars about specifically philosophical issues within the broad area of the study of emotions.

The European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions is a non-profit organization dedicated to fostering the philosophical study of emotions by providing a forum for exchanging views, so as to increase the interaction or collaboration among its members. The Society will make a special effort to involve young philosophers in its activities.

Although the title of the Society refers to European philosophers, the Society will be open to people from other countries, as well as to those who are not philosophers by profession, but have an interest in interacting academically with philosopher

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Organized by the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions and Instituto de Filosofia da Nova.

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# A1 Symposium on Romantic Love 1

## Distance is the New Romantic Closeness

*Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, University of Haifa, Israel*

Closeness is a crucial element determining emotional intensity. Since emotions are highly personal, they are usually elicited by those who are close to us. When a person is detached from us, we are unlikely to have any emotional attitude toward her. Distance typically decreases emotional intensity, as it is contrary to the involved and intimate perspective typical of emotions. Hence, love includes the wish to become as close as possible to the person we love. Indeed, geographical proximity and frequent face-to-face contacts have long been considered as crucial for promoting [romantic relationships](http://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/relationships). However, a growing body of research indicates otherwise: long-distance relationships often have equal or greater value in maintaining and promoting romantic relationships. Thus, distant relationships are characterized by higher levels of relationship quality on several indices including relationship adjustment, love for partner, fun with partner, conversational quality, and improved communication compared to those in close-proximity relationships. The commitment level among distant couples is similar to that of geographically close couple. Accordingly, distant relationships enjoy a higher rate of survival. Can we say then that (geographical) distance is the new romantic closeness? Is living apart together better than living together?

## Paradoxes of Love

*Robert Zaborowski, Jagiellonian University, Poland*

On several axes a reflection about love bumps into paradoxes. One such line of thinking starts with a question whether love is an active or a passive state. If love is active and can be produced and stopped at will, then it is not spontaneous and seems to be an act of will rather than an affective phenomena. If, contrariwise, it is spontaneous and can be neither produced nor stopped at will, it comes out to be a passive phenomena, a kind of being acted upon. On this axis love appears to be somewhere between spontaneity and deliberation.

Another axis concerns manifestation of love. Is expression of love a part of love and is love perceptible or not? If love is externally observable by its being necessary manifestable it looks similar to other emotions which are necessarily externalized. But if love is supposed to be a deeply felt experience, then it can be concealed. Yet, if it is concealed in this or that case, it happens that a beloved person can be unaware of being beloved. What then love turns out to be? Furthermore, how in such case the beloved person feels about being loved. If only by a verbal declaration, then love should be considered a matter of words. On the other hand, if a verbal declaration of love is unnecessary, it would mean that any beloved person should feel that s/he is in love because of this very fact, provided the act of love is genuine. Moreover, any false declaration in case of absence of genuine love should be recognized as such by the beloved person. But, if so, then it would be impossible to conceal love from the beloved.

Thirdly, does love operate in axiological realm of subjectivity or objectivity? Is love love by virtue of some universal value or is it centred first and foremost on the value of the beloved person? In the first case, the higher value of the object of love, the stronger love should be (and also it should be transposed from an object of a lower value to an object of a higher value). It would then be value–centric. In the second case love would be altruistic (altero–centric) and, therefore, a purely subjective phenomena, especially in the sense that once being set out, it could no more be aiming at the beloved person’s value because it would be love for the sake of this beloved person, whatever that beloved person would be.

Needless to say, that all three paradoxes are strongly related to one another. The paper will address the above issues from the perspective of considering love as an affective phenomena and will be an attempt to see how to disentangle the above paradoxes.

## What's so moral about Love?

*Monica Roland, UiO, Norway*

Contemporary philosophy of love has, roughly speaking, been preoccupied with two main topics: 1) the reasons for love and 2) the reasons of love. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, and Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, to mention a few, are often thought to belong to the group of philosophers concerned with the former, while Harry Frankfurt has primarily been interested in the latter. In this paper I take a look at David Velleman’s (1999) account of love. As opposed to what seems to be a widespread view, I will argue that Velleman’s main concern is not with the reasons for love. That is, Velleman’s account is not primarily about the causal reasons for love, nor is it about the justifying reasons for love. Rather, Velleman’s main concern, I argue, is with the content of the emotion or attitude of love.

On Velleman’s account, love is a moral emotion. It is moral in the sense that it necessarily involves the moral attitude of respect. Respect and love, Velleman argues, are responses to the same rational nature (inherent in everyone). Both involve an awareness and recognition of the other as an end, with the implication that respect and love are not just attitudes toward the other, but also volitional constraints. Seeing someone as an end constrains our wills in that it arrests our egoistic inclinations. It forces us to take the other’s interests and value into consideration in situations where we might be tempted “to put the other person to use”. What distinguishes the two, however, is that respect is in its essence purely cognitive – it is an attitude that, at least in principle, easily can be applied to an infinite number of persons, also those whom we will never meet – while love is both more exclusive; we only love a few, and seems to require more than just grasping someone’s personhood intellectually. Love, Velleman argues, “is not felt in contemplation of a mere concept or idea”. What is required in addition is that we see the person in the human being confronting us, and we can only do this by seeing her through her empirical persona.

I am very sympathetic to Velleman’s idea that love necessarily involves respect. However, Velleman has not given a satisfactory account of what it is that distinguishes love from respect. If love is, as suggested by Velleman, seeing the rational nature and inherent value of the other in the human being confronting you, then what distinguishes this type of seeing from respect? Respecting someone is also seeing the rational nature and inherent value of the other in the manifest person confronting you. What is missing from Velleman’s account, I argue, is an acknowledgment of love as not just seeing the other person’s “objective essence”, that is, the one thing that we all have in common, but also of seeing the other person’s “individual essence”; that is, the other person’s contingent, but still essential character.

## Love as Union: A Threat to Personal Autonomy?

*Michael Kühler, University of Munster, Germany*

The idea of love as a union between the lovers is still one of the most prominent and contested accounts of (romantic) love, dating back at least to Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s Symposium and being currently defended by authors such as Robert Solomon, Robert Nozick, and Mark Fisher. Critics, like notably Alan Soble, however, argue that abandoning the lovers’ independent identities or selves poses a threat to personal autonomy. For, ‘becoming one,’ the lovers would no longer be able to make decisions on their own, which, apparently, undermines their autonomy. Therefore, the notion of love as union should not be embraced but rejected.

In my paper I explore this criticism and, on the contrary, argue that love as union, while surely having tremendous impact on the lovers’ identities, poses no threat to their autonomy. Taking the criticism seriously, I assume a rather strong but still plausible interpretation of the union metaphor according to which the individual identities are subsumed to a shared ‘we identity.’ Likewise, personal autonomy is understood ambitiously for the task at hand, namely by presuming two seminal and contrasting individualist conceptions of personal autonomy based on the idea of an autonomous self: an existentialist account according to which we can choose freely who we want to be, on the one hand, and an essentialist account according to which the ability to make autonomous decisions depends on a ‘given’ self, on the other hand.

In order to reject the above criticism, I argue that, on the first account—following Jean-Paul Sartre and a libertarian idea of free will and autonomy—subsuming one’s identity to a shared ‘we identity’ nevertheless has to be understood as voluntarily chosen and maintained by each lover with regard to who he or she wants to be. Thus, it continuously presupposes personal autonomy instead of posing a threat to it. On the second account—following especially Harry G. Frankfurt’s current account of personal autonomy—love as union functions as a constituent of one’s ‘given’ self, defining it in terms of what one fundamentally cares about. Hence, it belongs to the basic presuppositions of being able to make autonomous decisions in the first place and, analogously, poses no threat to personal autonomy.

# A2 Defining Emotions

## The Unity of Caring

*Jeffrey Seidman, Vassar College, United States*

In recent work, philosophers have offered markedly different accounts of the nature of caring. Some have argued that caring is at least partly constituted by emotions and emotional dispositions (Jaworksa, Helm); others have argued thait caring involves dispositions to see certain considerations as reasons (Helm, Seidman) or dispositions to exclude certain options from consideration in practical deliberation (Seidman). I argue that these three claims are not in competition, and that caring is an attitude with emotional, cognitive, and deliberative aspects. If this is right, however, it raises the question: why should we conceive of caring as a single, unified attitude, as opposed to a cluster of dissociable mental states and dispositions?

I consider an answer offered by Helm, before arguing for an alternative. Helm argues that the emotions and other attitudes involved in caring are connected to one another in a structured pattern by various rational requirements, loosely analogous to the requirements of consistency and coherence thought to govern beliefs and intentions. I argue that these apparent rational requirements are “mythical,” in the sense developed by Raz and Kolodny: they are epiphenomena, the apparent normative force of which is explained a very different normative requirement to respond appropriately to the reasons one has. (I do not presume that Raz and Kolodny are right that the requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs and intentions are mythical; but I argue that if these requirements can escape their argument, it is because beliefs and intentions have features that emotions lack.) This argument seems to put the cognitive aspect of caring at the center: an agent who cares about, for instance, some personal project sees it as a source of (agent-relative) reasons for diverse emotions, desires, and actions – and the emotions, desires and intentions involved in caring are united by the fact that they are responses to these perceived reasons. But this only relocates the question about unity: what explains, and what connects, the diverse reasons that the agent sees the project as giving? While the answer appears mysterious if we focus on many of the objects, from institutions to projects to aesthetic or political ideals, that rational agents can care about, the mystery dissipates when we look at instances of caring that are etiologically basic – most notably, agents’ caring about their own welfare. In this case, the same (well-remarked) adaptive advantages that explain the evolution of the each of the emotions involved in caring singly also explain why they should evolve and function as a suite. In creatures whose action and emotion is (sometimes) mediated by rational deliberation, a view of the landscape of reasons according to which some objects give reasons for these attitudes and others do not will be part of the same suite. Rational creatures have repurposed this suite of attitudes, so that we take it toward objects, such as aesthetic values, where there is no adaptive advantage in doing so. But the attitudes involved in caring about such objects are, nonetheless, united by their common etiology.

## On the Ontology of Grief

*Johannes Ernst Hoerning, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong*

Peter Goldie provides an account of the ontology of grief as a process that unfolds over time and involves more than one mental state or event. It is a characteristic of processes that they can be telic or atelic. While the former are movements or tendencies towards endpoints (e.g. running a race or walking to the shop), the latter are open-ended (e.g. running or walking). Goldie's account, however, does not tell us whether grief should be regarded as a telic or atelic process. The aim of this paper is to fill in this lacuna in Goldie's account. Suppose grief is a telic process and its telos is the event of coming to terms with a loss. What are the implications of this view for an account of the ontology of emotions? Secondly, can we say that a subject has succeeded or failed to achieve her grief's telos? Suppose, on the other hand, that grief is atelic. How do we make sense of the fact that it is in the nature of grief that it ultimately subsides? To answer these questions, I will consider two fictional examples of grief and their significance for Goldie's claim that we experience grief as a coherent process whose different stages hang together into a unified whole.

## Disembodying James. What the Stream of Thought teaches us about Emotions

*Anja Berninger, University of Stuttgart, Germany*

William James’ theory of emotions has made a startling comeback. While in the heydays of judgment theories his approach was generally considered a non-starter, current emotion research has seen a surge in Jamesian positions. This recent enthusiasm is mainly due to the central place that James accords to the human body. It is frequently suggested that his position, even if not plausible by itself, nevertheless hints at a way in which the theory of emotions can give physiological aspects their due without denying that there are cognitive elements to account for as well.

While this strand of research has delivered important results, there are other aspects of James’ approach, which can be put to use in gaining a better understanding of the emotions, but which have nevertheless largely been ignored. In my talk, I want to focus on one of these ideas, namely James’ general approach to mental phenomena. A central idea he develops in the Principles of Psychology is that we should not consider simple states such as sensations as fundamental building blocks from which all other mental states can be derived. Rather, he declares some form of continuous, introspectively available mental activity (the “stream of thought”) as the central element on which theories of mind should focus. He also hints at the fact that this stream of thought can take different shapes at different times (e.g. progressing with greater or lesser speed) although he does not work out this idea in detail.

On first glance, these reflections seem to have no impact for emotion theory. However, as I show, this assessment is mistaken. I develop my argument in three steps: In a first step, I outline both phenomenal and empirical evidence for the fact that emotions modify our mental activity. In a second step, I show that current theories of emotions (especially those that understand emotions as representational states) are ill equipped to incorporate this evidence. In a third step, I show that we can accommodate these aspects by bringing the stream of thought back into view. More precisely, we need to understand emotions not as single mental states, but rather as specific shapes the stream of thought can take.

I develop this idea in more detail in the last section of my talk. I suggest three parameters which can be used to describe the different shapes a stream of thought can take: (a) temporal aspects (such as the speed with which our thoughts progress), (b) the variability that the content of our thoughts may display, (c) the relation between different elements in the stream of thought (such as their respective degrees of salience). I go on to discuss whether this approach is suited to differentiate between emotion types. Here, I show that a whole row of emotions can be distinguished with the aid of the parameters discussed. I conclude my talk with some brief comments on the function we can ascribe to emotions given this approach.

## Looking into Meta-Emotions

*Christoph Jäger, University of Innsbruck, Austria*

“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself”, Franklin Roosevelt declared in his inaugural address. However we may interpret and evaluate the political implications of this statement, it relies on an interesting philosophical and psychological assumption. Not only do we have emotions; we also have emotions about our emotions. I call such higher-order affective states or episodes ‘meta-emotions’. Despite their prevalence and, I maintain, their great significance for understanding the mechanisms by which persons critically engage with their selves, to date meta-emotions have not received much systematic attention in the literature. This article begins to fill this lacuna. After some introductory clarifications, I set out some initial arguments for meta-emotions, distinguish various kinds of them, and sketch their intentional structure (section 2). Yet, some may remain critical. In particular, empirically minded philosophers may object that the claims of this paper need a reality check. I agree that the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy of the emotions ought to be not only consistent with, but preferably also supported by empirical data. In section 3 I present three case studies which, employing Paul Ekman’s and Wallace Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System (FACS), provide further evidence for the view that people engage in meta-emotional appraisal of their affective lives. FACS-analyses of (video footage of) psychotherapy sessions and di-agnostic interviews strongly suggest that the clients assess their first-order emotions by engaging in meta-emotions. In the final part of the paper I outline the significance of my argument for the philosophy of the self. Accounts in the tradition of Harry Frankfurt construe conditions of reflective self-appraisal in terms of hierarchies within the structure of a person’s desires: we have, Frankfurt and friends argue, desires about our own desires. However, such approaches neglect an important aspect of our critical engagement with our selves. First, the relevant first-order objects of self-endorsement or distancing oneself from one’s self include not only volitions but also emotions. Second, contrary to what Frankfurt-style accounts suggest, not only do we critically engage with our first-order selves by having higher-order desires. We also enter into affective higher-order self-appraisals. Contemporary higher-order theories of psychic harmony thus need to be supplemented by a theory of meta-emotions.

# A3 Individual Papers

## On Pridelessness

*Jeremy Fischer, University of Calgary, Canada*

In a recent defense of the moral value of humility, J. L. A. Garcia argues that experiencing pride, even when it is properly directed at admirable or enviable personal qualities, either involves or threatens to cause a potentially blameworthy misdirection of attention away from the needs and demands of others and towards the self. (J. L. A. Garcia, “Being Unimpressed With Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility,” Philosophia (2006), 34: 417-435.) In another recent article, James Kellenberger argues that the potential benefits of experiencing proper pride are overwhelmingly outweighed by these moral costs. (James Kellenberger, “Humility,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 4, 2010, pp. 321-336.) Moreover, Kellenberger denies that the valuable self-knowledge and focus on self-improvement that might accompany the emotion of pride require experiencing pride. The virtuously humble person, on this view, concerns herself with the demands of the world and the effects of her activity on the world, and never with how her activity reflects upon her personal worth.

By contrast, psychologists who study the personality trait of perfectionism, which is traditionally characterized as a “striving for flawlessness and setting of excessively high standards for performance accompanied by tendencies for overly critical evaluations of [one’s] behavior,” argue that experiencing pride is of considerable psychological value. (J. Stoeber, R. A. Harris, and P.S. Moon, “Perfectionism and the experience of pride, shame, and guilt: Comparing healthy perfectionists, unhealthy perfectionists, and nonperfectionists,” Personality and Individual Differences, 43(1), 2007: 131-141; 131.) For instance, D. E. Hamachek draws his influential distinction between “neurotic” perfectionism and “normal” perfectionism partly on the basis of whether the subject feels pride in his or her accomplishments; neurotic perfectionists are unable to feel pride when it would be proper. (D. E. Hamachek, “Psychodynamics of normal and neurotic perfectionism,” Psychology, 15(1), 1978; 27-33.)

In this paper, I argue that the failure to experience the emotion of proper pride provides evidence, in some circumstances, of an ethical failure. I call this failure “pridelessness” to make plain that the failure to experience proper pride is troublingly similar to the flaw of shamelessness. Experiencing proper pride is morally significant for at least two reasons. First, proper pride embodies the judgment that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. So, the failure to experience pride evinces either one’s ignorance of what matters to oneself or a failure to grasp the significance of achievements that have personal import. Second, experiencing pride provides evidence that one cares about, and registers the significance of, living in accordance with one’s personal ideals and, so, about being a good person. Finally, I argue that experiencing pride does not in general pose an obstacle to giving others the respect they are due in virtue of their status as moral agents. We do not owe to others blindness to ourselves.

## Guilt, Pride and Morality

*Matthew Bennett, University of Essex, United Kingdom*

Those moral philosophers who have chosen to concentrate on the role of reactive attitudes in the moral life, from Strawson to Darwall, have included a range of moral sentiments in their requirements for moral standing. Being moral, according to such accounts, will involve the capacity for these moral sentiments. One such sentiment is guilt. It has been argued that without the capacity for guilt a person cannot be thought of as a moral agent, because such a person is incapable of correcting himself in the face of a moral lapse, and accordingly is only capable of being directed by external constraints. A moral life, according to such a view, must be self-directed, and accordingly the moral person must be capable of directing his own action by means of conscience.

In this paper I aim to raise a question that has not, yet must be, answered by this account, particularly with regards to the claim that a moral life must involve guilt. The question is whether the demands of morality met by the capacity for guilt might instead be met by the capacity for a conscience without guilt.

The question will be raised in light of a distinction made by Nietzsche between the experience of bad or guilty conscience, and the experience of a proud conscience. The former is considered valuable for us insofar as it is a way of recognising and taking responsibility for something I have done wrong, and is a way of emotionally registering that wrongdoing such that it motivates me to correct the wrong in some way. However I will argue that Nietzsche was right to suggest that we can have both of these benefits of guilt by instead having a conscience whose primary emotion is pride.

A moment of guilty conscience draws our attention to a wrongdoing and spurs reparation through discomfort of some kind. By contrast, in an instance of proud conscience we recognise that we have done something wrong when we see that we have fallen short of what we are capable. In such moments we are likely to think to ourselves that “I am better than that”. When we relate to our behaviour in such a way, we can both recognise that the wrong is something for which we are responsible and yet think of ourselves as significantly better than the version of ourselves who committed that wrong. Moments of this alternative conscience, then, can both help us recognise where we have gone wrong, but also spur us to do better not through guilt, but through pride in our capacity to do better in future. Proud conscience can motivate morality not through avoiding more guilt, but through the incentive to live up to ourselves.

## The Epistemic Role of Emotions, and the New Epistemic Challenge to Dogmatism

*Tommaso Piazza, University of Pavia, Italy*

*Luca Moretti University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom*

Dogmatism is the view about perceptual justification according to which if S has an experience as of P, S acquires prima facie immediate justification for believing P. Cognitively penetrated experiences seem to underwrite a promising strategy against Dogmatism. For if S’s experience as of P is cognitively penetrated by some of S’s unjustified pre-existing beliefs about what S will perceive, the experience seems simply unable to provide S even with prima facie justification for believing P. If this intuition (henceforth, ∼D) is correct, dogmatism is arguably refuted. Should we however trust ∼D?

J. Vance (forthcoming) argues that we should. He does so by mounting an argument by analogy. According to Vance, 1) cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences bear a strict similarity to cognitively penetrated emotions; since 2) emotions cognitively penetrated by unjustified beliefs fail to justify, Vance concludes that it is nothing but to be expected that, as correctly diagnosed by ∼D, 3) perceptual experiences cognitively penetrated by unjustified beliefs fail to justify.

My aim in this talk is to show that Vance’s strategy is poorly supported, at best, or defective at worse. The claim I shall try to establish, in particular, is that 1) and 2) fail to support – let alone contribute to explain – 3). The analogy drawn by Vance would warrant 3) only if an emotion’s inability to justify were clearly imputable to the fact that it is cognitively penetrated by an unjustified belief. However, a simpler and better explanation, dispensing altogether with the controversial hypothesis that emotions ever justify, is available.

In normal conditions, like for instance when S has an experience as of a snake approaching, the resulting emotional experience of fear – according to Vance – justifies S in believing that there is danger nearby. Not so when S’s emotional experience is cognitively penetrated by an unjustified belief, like for instance when S’s fear – in Vance’s second example – is penetrated by S’s unreasonable conviction that an intruder is in the house. The belief that there’s danger nearby is justified just in the first, and not in the second case. This, however, can be explained without crediting emotions with the power to justify; and so without crediting cognitive penetration by unreasonable belief with the power to compromise it. A much simpler explanation is that, in the first case, S’s belief that there is danger nearby is justified not by S’s fear, but by S’s perceptual experience as of a snake approaching plus S’s background belief that snakes are dangerous. In a parallel way, the same belief is unjustified in the second case not because it is based on an emotional experience that is cognitively penetrated by an unreasonable belief, but, more directly, because is based – among other things – on S’s unreasonable belief that there’s an intruder.

Interpreted in this way, Vance’s second example does not anymore lend support to the claim that – at least in the case of emotions – cognitive penetration by unreasonable belief has the power to compromise a state’s ability to justify. If so, however, Vance’s analogy between experiences and emotions ha no bearing on ∼D.

## Have You changed?

*Demian Whiting, University of Hull, United Kingdom*

Is emotion needed for moral judgment? Many take the existence of psychopaths to be good reason to think it is; for many people think psychopaths are unable to distinguish right from wrong and that their inability to do this is due to a failure to undergo emotions such as anxiety and distress. However, the empirical evidence regarding psychopaths is inconclusive and so we may need to look elsewhere for reason to think moral judgment needs emotion. In this paper I broach the question by asking a slightly different one, namely: *why* might moral judgment require emotion? I consider but reject two answers that might be given before offering my own.

# B1 Individual Papers

## Emotive Latteral Thinking

*Theodore Scaltsas, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom*

My paper explores new non-linear reasoning processes, as fundamental heuristic devices in problem solving. My account is based on recent results in cognitive science, which have marked a breakthrough in our understanding of the roots of thinking and its relation to emotion and representation. I have developed a theory of creative thinking, Emotive Lateral Thinking, towards building solution-possibilities based on abstract structural or affective features of problem cases. My account builds on Antonio Damasio’s and Keith Stenning’s work on the cognitive role of emotions. Damasio has shown that emotions are a more primitive ground of reasoning and of decision making than concepts, having guided action, pre-conceptually, from very early on in our evolutionary chain. Stenning (2002) built on the experimental findings of Damasio, utilising Wittgenstein’s semantic theory of definition to explain how emotions operate as the ground of abstraction and classification in comprehending the world around us, by underlying analogy, comparison, and similarity. I use these results to build a new model of lateral thinking. Stenning built on the results of the neuropsychological experiments of Antonio Damasio, which have shown that emotions are much more primitive as a ground of reasoning and of decisions to act than concepts (Damasio, 1999), (Damasio, 2003), (Damasio, 2005), (Damasio, 2010). Emotions have guided action, pre-conceptually, as early in the evolutionary chain as before simple organisms were formed – when there were only gene formations of life. Concepts came much later, not to replace the action-compass of emotions, but as an additional layer of thinking and guide to action, which remained grounded on the functionality of emotional evaluations of the environment for action-aiming reasoning and decisions. Stenning (2002) built on the experimental findings of Damasio, utilising Wittgenstein’s semantic theory of definition, and explained how emotions operate as the ground of abstracting and of classifying on the basis of similarities of impact of the environment on the reasoner. More generally, the way the world impacts on us emotionally grounds the way we comprehend our world. We classify things, activities, relations in our environment on the basis of the feelings generated in us from infancy in our interaction with our environment (Stenning, 2002). It is emotions that operate underlying analogy, comparison, and similarity. The concepts we use to classify and order our representations of what there is around us have non-linear, affective foundations; these affective foundations predate, evolutionarily, the creation of language, and have guided our behaviour towards others, and towards cooperative or adversarial situations in our environment. My account of emotive lateral thinking will be guided by the results of this research and will offer a new emergent understanding of the nature of lateral reasoning using emotive judgements. The account will give rise to new methodologies of creative reasoning that have not been proposed before, which will enrich our problem-solving techniques. Damasio, A., The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York, New York: Harcourt, 1999). Damasio, A., Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. (New York, New York: Harcourt, 2003). Damasio, A. Descartes' Error (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

Damasio, A.. Self Comes to Mind. (New York, New York: Pantheon, 2010). Stenning, K., Seeing Reason: Image and Language in Learning to Think, Oxford Cognitive Science Series, 2002.

## Arguing about Feelings: Argumentation Schemes for Reasoning about Emotions

*Franck Lihoreau, New University of Lisbon, Portugal*

From the early rhetoricians’ insistance on emotional appeal as a pragmatic factor of persuasion (Aristotle, Cicero, inter alia) to the most recent research on argumentative uses of emotive language (e.g. [Macagno & Walton 2010]), work on emotion and argumentation has tended to focus on how emotions can be put to use in argumentation. By contrast, the role that argumentation may play in emotion and emotional appraisal has been totally overlooked.

Yet, as a matter of fact, we do not just argue with emotions, we also argue about emotions, and we do it all the time, telling people how they should or shouldn’t feel, contesting their “bad” reasons for feeling the way they do, and giving them “good” reasons why they should feel otherwise. We thus act on the assumption that emotions can properly be subject to normative evaluation and that feelings are reason-based. This points to the idea of an “argumentative structure of emotions” and suggests argumentation as a mechanism for generating reasons for or against entertaining feelings. To this day, however, no attempt has been made to elucidate that structure and to develop a comprehensive model of argumentation for reasoning about emotions.

To remedy this situation, following [Walton et al. 2008], we set out to provide a set of argumentation schemes for reasoning about emotions like hope/fear, disappointment/-relief, etc., and the sets of critical questions associated with them. The schemes will consist in patterns to generate reasons why a certain emotion (with a certain intensity) may be entertained or maintained. For each such scheme, the customized set of critical questions would capture cases where the scheme might not apply or be used to derive a lower intensity for the targeted emotion.

The question whether a proposed list of schemes and critical questions is exhaustive is hard to settle. To help us achieve exhaustivity, we will use as an underlying affective model a version of the “appraisal theory” of emotions (e.g. [Lazarus 1991];[Scherer et al. 2001]), according to which emotions involves evaluations. To be precise, we will use the simplified version found in [Castelfranchi & Lorini 2003], on which emotions can always be reduced to a combination of beliefs and desires (e.g. fear is the feeling one has when, desiring that p but envisaging the possibility that not-p, one believes to a certain strength that indeed not-p). This toy affective model will serve as a heuristic to help us find and sort out appropriate schemes and critical questions.

By investigating those argumentative patterns applying to feelings and their normative evaluation, we hope to make a first step towards elucidating the reason-based structure of affects and to advance a better understanding of the rational (re-)construction of emotions.

## Crisis and the Will

*Andrea Borsato, independent scholar, Italy*

Suppose you are trying to solve a puzzle. At the beginning it makes fun – itʼs your favourite hobby – but suddenly it becomes difficult, and after a while it doesnʼt make fun any more. Something in the execution of the task went wrong, and still you donʼt give up; on the contrary, the intensity of your will is not weakened but rather reinforced by the failure of your attempts. This is a phenomenon observed, among others, by Kurt Lewin, often occurring after the iteration of an action has lead to saturation: itʼs easier to distract a subject from the task if the execution succeds than if something goes wrong. Now, think of the Scholastic view‚ quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boniʼ (whatever is desired, is desired under the guise of the good): can such view also account for the increasing intensity of the will stimulated by the failure of a given task, and how? First of all, we can distinguish a weak and a strong reading of the guise of the good thesis. The weak reading goes as follows: If a content x is desired or wanted, then x just have a positive value. In this sense, the increase of the will associated with the failure of a task is not – at least prima facie – a counterexample to the weak reading, at least assuming that the positive value of solving the puzzle, is diminished, but not annihilated by its provisory failure: I still intend to solve the puzzle, I want it with an even stronger volition, because Iʼm always enjoying it – although maybe not as much as I enjoyed it at first. If we regard the guise of the good thesis in the weak reading as true, we are here committed to the view that, if solving the puzzle wouldnʼt make fun any more, our will to solve the puzzle would immediately disappear. To ascertain whether this is true could be an interesting task of empirical research. But think now of a stronger version of the guise od the good thesis: If a content x is desired or wanted, then x must have a positive value and the increase or decrease of the intensity of the desire of the will must correspond to an increase or decrease of the positive value of x. The experience described above now clearly seems to speak – at least prima facie – against such stronger view: we are here namely facing a case in which the positive value of x is decreasing, while the intensity of the volition directed at x is clearly increasing. Our aim is to investigate the relation between such experiences of immotivate increasing of the intensity of the volition elicited by the failure of a task and the guise of the good thesis, of which we will try to reject both the weak and the strong reading; we will instead try to argue in favor of the view that the increase of the volitional intensity correlates at best with a simple increment of attention to the task, rather than with an increment of the positive value of it.

# B2 Symposium on Emotions & Literature

## “And What Was There Accepted Us“ – On Aesthetic Resonance

*Angelika Krebs, University of Basel, Switzerland*

What does it mean to aesthetically experience a landscape? And how does art, e.g. nature poetry, help us with this?

My main claim is that to aesthetically experience a *landscape* we have, first, to see it through the metaphor of human life (I call this the *“expressive”* model in contrast to the “causal”, “associative” or “animistic” models). Second, we have to move with or dance or sympathize with its atmosphere for its own sake. *Sympathy with* is more than perception, empathy or infection. It is an active, positive, emotional response.

Perfect sympathy feels like unity although it is strictly speaking “only” perfect understanding and coordination. In perfect sympathy we *resonate* with the world and feel accepted, immersed, at home in it.

In reading nature poetry, e.g. Michael Donhauser’s *Variations in Prose* (2013) which begins with “And what as there accepted us” (“Und was da war, es nahm uns an”), we move with the words which move with nature. Poetry provides us with *vehicles* for our own emotions. As Roger Scruton puts it, we encounter works of artas “icons of our felt potential, and appropriate them in order to bring form, lucidity, and self-knowledge to our inner life.”

## The Impact of Novels on the Emotional Life

*Adrian Wettstein, University of Basel, Switzerland*

It seems quite uncontroversial that emotions can be shaped in many different ways. However, it is less clear how this works in detail. Aristotle renownedly expressed the view that the reception of fictional literature plays an important role in the development of emotions. In my talk, I want to reconsider this assumption. The focus will be on the potential of novels to cultivate emotional dispositions in a positive way, namely to make them more reasonable and appropriate.

Such an emotional education is not an automatic transformation that the reader undergoes passively. When someone reads a novel, he is usually active in many respects. The alert reader imagines the characters and situations as the story gradually unfolds. He accompanies the protagonists and reacts with empathy or sympathy when they are in need. He thinks about their situations, relationships and conflicts. In short, he is involved in the story with thought and feeling. Maybe he also takes the novel as a vehicle that mirrors some of his own life experiences. My thesis is that (under certain conditions) emotions can be shaped through this active reading process. At least four different formative emotional processes can be distinguished:

• First of all, the reading of novels can foster a sensibility for things that are of vital importance. A detailed and expressive description may direct the reader’s attention to some valuable particular thing that he was blind to before. He can discover that this thing has a value in his own life. Such a newfound sensibility might be at least a first step for the awakening of previously undetected feelings.

• When people attentively read a novel, they usually experience an emotional journey that is guided by the form and content of the text. They constantly accompany the characters and their fictional situations and try to find an appropriate emotional response. In so doing, readers in a way rehearse emotions while reading and take to some ways of feeling that are outlined in the literary narrative.

• Great writers like Henry James or Leo Tolstoy are able to describe emotions with great accuracy in a dense and subtle language. When readers enter into their stories, their attention is directed to the complexity as well as the details of emotional life. It seems plausible that reading literature not just helps readers to learn how to describe and articulate particular emotions but also to improve their ability to discriminate the diversity and nuances of emotions.

• When someone reads a novel, he is usually also encouraged to reflect upon emotion-related aspects. When a protagonist is actuated by jealousy, the reader is asked to reconsider the appropriateness and the dangers of such an emotion. This critical reflection could lead him to evaluations and insights that are relevant to his own emotional life.

In summary, my aim is to show that novels have a specific potential to educate emotions. In order to expound this argument, I will outline four different processes that shape emotions.

## Concepts in Literature. Love and the Function of a Third Person

*Barbara Merker, University of Frankfurt, Germany*

# B3 Individual Papers

## Emotions and Moral Judgments

*Luciana Ceri, University of Florence, Italy*

What kind of mental state an emotion is? Do moral judgements express any emotions? These questions are relevant to theories of moral judgement, in particular to ethical nondescriptivism, according to which moral judgements express certain noncognitive or conative mental states. First I shall expound an argument for nondescriptivism which is based on the following premises:

1. Moral judgement internalism, which holds that there is an internal and, therefore, necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation to act accordingly. So it is not conceptually possible that one sincerely makes a moral judgement without being motivated to act accordingly.

2. Conativism, which holds that motivation is internal to conative states such as desires. Conative states are not sufficient to move someone to act; for she must also have certain beliefs or other cognitive states. Conative states, however, play a dominant role in motivation.

Then I will tackle the question of whether an emotivist version of nondescriptivism is consistent with this argument. It can only support emotivism if emotions play that dominant role in motivation which premise 2 ascribes to desires.

I shall argue that emotions cannot play that role, because they are not purely conative states. Emotions and desires are distinct mental states, and play different roles in our mind. Emotions are conceptually dependent on certain beliefs and sensitive to reality, and have (just like beliefs) the mind-to-world direction of fit. Yet, motivation has a teleological structure: being motivated to act is pursuing some goal, which is something to be achieved or realized in the future. So the mental state one must have for being motivated is directed at future objects or states of affairs. It has the world-to-mind direction of fit: it aims at changing the world.

While some emotions are directed at future, however, other emotions are not: emotional states such as regret and remorse are backward-looking, that is, directed at past events or states of affairs.

Therefore, emotions are not intrinsically motivating states, and only if they involve some desires can they motivate to act.

Nonetheless, emotions are relevant to the explanation of the motivating force of moral judgements. An analysis of emotion, therefore, helps to account for the practicality of such judgements.

I shall show that by turning to premise 1 of the argument for nondescriptivism and arguing for it as follows:

- moral judgements must be supported by (justifying) reasons;

- the reasons that justify one’s moral judgement can motivate one to act accordingly;

therefore:

- moral judgements can motivate to act accordingly.

I shall argue that moral judgement is the outcome of a deliberative process whereby one can know which reasons justify some particular action. It is not sufficient, however, that one know the reasons that justify a judgement for one to be moved to act accordingly; one must also pay attention to them. And emotions are one of the main mechanisms that guide attention: emotional quality gives attentional focus a specific direction, emotional intensity directs the breadth of attentional focus.

## Insights and Challenges in Cross-Disciplinary Work

*Rebecca Kingston, University of Toronto, Canada*

This paper provides a synopsis of both the challenges encountered and potential benefits in developing more radical cross-disciplinary work in the emotions. It draws on my experience of the last several years of organizing an interdisciplinary conference and then putting together an edited volume of papers from disciplines as varied as neuroscience and Renaissance literature. The basic question asked by the paper is given the ability of most humans to understand the basic features of our own emotional lives (a basic foundation for understanding across the human sciences as argued by Peter Winch), how can we or could we translate that shared experience in a way that allows for deeper interdisciplinary dialogue? It will also seek to answer the question as to whether there might be anything we could judge as a given, or broadly acknowledged in the field of the study of emotions and what sort of framework we might consider to make sense of a broad array of literature on the emotions starting from within the social sciences, and then possibly beyond.

## Inconsistency in the Sartrean Account of Love: Redefining Love(s) as Exclusively Rational or Innate

*Oliver Downing, University of Liverpool, United Kingdom*

Whilst Sartrean existentialism has for some time been in disfavour with philosophical trends, it has recently attracted consideration for its practical applications such as psychotherapy and study of emotions. Although most scholarly attention has targeted Sartre’s supposed affiliation with Cartesianism and description of human emotional interaction being fundamentally sadistic and masochistic, current debates have initiated a refocusing onto important matters of consistency in Sartre’s theory of emotions. Notably, the debate between Sarah Richmond and Anthony Hatzimoysis concentrated on whether it is possible to read Sartre’s theory of emotion without it being undermined by its apparent inconsistencies. These debates, however, have been brief and remained in the abstract territory of Sketch for a Theory of Emotions, whereas the wider problems of inconsistency in Sartre’s description of emotion in Being and Nothingness have so far escaped such attention.

This paper will develop on Hatzimoysis’s reading of Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions which holds that Sartre presents two theories of emotional processes that are ultimately consistent as two corresponding elements of an overall theory. This paper will extrapolate Hatzimoysis’s reading into an analysis of Being and Nothingness and explore the ostensible contradictions in Sartre’s account of love. Specifically, this paper will consider Sartre’s description of love as a reflective project functioning on a rational level in contrast with his more consistently expressed assertions that love is an expression of an innate ontological need to corroborate one’s estimation of oneself necessitated by being-in-the-world qua being-for-others. This paper will conclude by considering the interpretive problems these inconsistencies present to current readings of Sartre’s theory of love and emotions, and will appraise whether reading love as innate, reflective or both produces the more consistent and coherent theory.

This paper will argue that the interpretive problem in Sartre’s account of love and emotions can be overcome by viewing love as two distinct forms: one which is born out of innate, biological and socially constructed impulses; and a second which derives from reflective and rational projects. Furthermore, this paper will demonstrate that the problem can be traced to Sartre’s dogmatic insistence on human subjects’ essential, radical and unmitigated freedom which necessitates that Sartre’s for-itself must constitute its own innate qualities which, in turn, results in the problematic understanding of rational and innate processes as one and the same. Moreover, this paper will suggest that ultimately Sartre only observes one type of love where there are two because of his refusal to consider the metaphysical question of origins. This paper will argue the above by suggesting that adopting a dualistic ontology – where the human subject develops broadly in coherence with constructivist models and subsequently gains freedom and transcendence – can explain the binary forms of love and that the content of the subject’s construction can explain the manifold varieties and experiences of love. Thus, this paper will provide a way of reading Sartre and his theoretical implications for the philosophical study of emotions without relying on the inconsistency present in the text and subsequent readings of the text.

# C1 Emotion Regulation

## Emotion Regulation and Responsibility

*Tom Roberts, University of Exeter, United Kingdom*

Often, we hold individuals responsible for the emotions they undergo - for instance, we criticise a person for finding a racist joke amusing, and we praise someone for feeling righteous anger when she encounters injustice. Two competing approaches to the nature of emotional responsibility have emerged in the literature, whose defining disagreement is over the extent to which a subject must exert voluntary control over her emotions in order to be an appropriate target of praise or blame for them. On the one hand, Aristotelian accounts hold that a person's responsibility lies in the cultivation of character traits over time - the (often deliberate and self-conscious) development of emotional tendencies and responses over the course of a life. On the other hand, reasons-responsiveness views hold that what matters is the agent's rational sensitivity to appropriate kinds of reason, a sensitivity that reveals or discloses her values and identity. For example, a person is responsible for episodes of fear just when these states respond in a suitable way to dangers or threats. On theories of this kind, the historical provenance of an individual's emotional capacities, and the extent to which she has exerted voluntary control over them, is largely immaterial to the question of whether she is responsible for their outputs.

I argue that these two approaches to understanding the nature of emotional responsibility have paid insufficient attention to our powers of emotional self-regulation, which offer a degree of short-term voluntary control over our affective states that is not the same as the long-term cultivation of character promoted by Aristotelian views, and which is not captured by reasons-responsiveness as typically understood. Our capacities of emotion-regulation come in several forms, including situation-selection and modification; cognitive change; attention-direction; and modification of expression. These powers permit us to modulate, supress, initiate, or encourage emotional states in the course of our moment-to-moment affective responding. Regulatory powers can be exercised in such a way as to be in opposition to the subject's rational assessment of her situation (for instance, she can control her fear even though she takes herself to be in peril), or they can be deployed in order to bring her emotional response into line with that assessment (for example, to bring forth her grief at the loss of a loved one).

Self-regulation contributes to our emotional responsibility, then, by offering ways of voluntarily affecting our emotional states that do not rely on long-term cultivation of character, and which do not always align with our rational assessment of relevant reasons. A thoroughgoing theory of emotional responsibility must attend to self-regulation.

## Emotion Regulation

*Frøydis Gammelsæter, University of Oslo, Norway*

Emotion regulation is often presented as one of the purposive goals of drug-use amongst addicts, and the inability to regulate or deal with emotions otherwise as an explanation of why they keep doing it. But what is emotion regulation? And how can it be both what addicts do when they do drugs and something which they are “bad” at? In this paper I look at two accounts of emotion regulation that can be found in philosophy: a self-control account and a generation or character account. These views differ in the role that they give to emotion in the self, and I argue that we must take on the second account in order to make sense of cases of addiction as emotion regulation.

## Recalcitrant Emotions and the Structure of the Soul

*Jamie Dow, University of Leeds, United Kingdom*

Consideration of the conflict between dispassionate beliefs and emotions has a long history in the study of the emotions. Appeal to recalcitrant emotions has been used to disparage judgement-based and perception-based theories of emotion, or to argue for some middle way between them. This, I contend, is a rather limited use of a very rich set of phenomena that present a complex and under-explored set of desiderata for an account of the emotions. The complexity arises from (1) the distinction between the possibility of recalcitrant emotions and their propriety; (2) the differences between different kinds of recalictrant emotions, regarding both their possibility and their propriety (compare e.g. recalcitrant grief and recalcitrant fear); and (3) a careful specification of what is required to account for the particular kinds of rational conflict and (often) irrationality involved in recalcitrant emotions in even familiar cases of recalcitrant fear, anger or jealousy. Having called attention to the range of ways in which recalcitrant emotions serve to test theories of emotion, I focus on (3) above. A theory must account correctly for the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, without over-stating that irrationality. Accordingly, emotions must involve a some level of assent to their contents, akin to that involved in belief. This generates the rational conflict between emotions and beliefs in cases of recalcitrant emotion. Emotions differ from beliefs, however, in being subject to less weighty epistemic norms, a fact which itself is revealing but stands in need of explanation. It is itself best explained, I argue, by the proper function of emotions in our mental economy: emotions are not themselves the final arbiters of what a person believes and does. That is to say, they occupy a subordinate role in a hierarchically-structured psychology. Such a view, of course, has a significant pedigree among the ancients (most obviously Plato and Aristotle), but may be motivated today (1) partly by its explanatory power in accounting for our intuitions about the appropriate relationship between emotions and reasoning; and (2) by appeal to a wider set of considerations favouring a supervisory role for reasoning in the mental economy of humans. If successful, it explains why the epistemic norms governing emotions are less weighty that those governing beliefs; and this in turn explains why the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions is not as severe as knowingly affirming and denying simultaneously the very same thing.

# C2 Symposium on Situated Affectivity

## Ways of Emotional Situatedness

*Achim Stephan, University of Osnabrueck, Germany*

*Sven Walter, University of Osnabrueck, Germany*

## Dispositional Affect and the Extended Mind

*Giovanna Colombetti, University of Exeter, United Kingdom*

Over the past decades, research in (the philosophy of) cognitive science has shown that body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the natural and social world contribute to an agent’s cognitive life. The corresponding embodied, embedded, extended, distributed and enactive approaches to cognition have recently been discussed under the common heading of “situated cognition.”

Although the role of the body and the (mainly cultural and social) environment has also been a principal topic in emotion research for decades, the two strands of discussion have largely been out of touch with each other. We believe that applying the concepts from the situated cognition debate to emotions can open up new avenues of research in the philosophy of emotions. Yet, there is still a lot to be done before we get a firm grip on the corresponding idea of situated affectivity in its various guises.

To avoid conceptual pitfalls by addressing the well-known body- and world-dependence of affective phenomena in the light of the new concepts drawn from the debate about situated cognition, we need both a firm understanding of the conceptual details of the debate about situated cognition and a deep understanding of the characteristic kinds of body- and world-dependence of various affective phenomena. Since a lot depends on what is meant by calling cognition “embodied,” “embedded,” “extended,” “distributed” and “enactive,” the first and introductory talk will address this issue before returning to affectivity. Whereas the talk about embodied and embedded emotions – in contrast to the corresponding accounts of cognition – does not lead to any significant revelations, the debate on extended, distributed and enacted emotions can offer substantial new insights for the philosophy of emotions. Particularly, extended emotions are in the focus of the two other contributions.

The thesis of the Extended Mind (ExM) holds that the material underpinnings of an individual’s mental states need not be restricted to those contained within its biological boundaries, but can include extra-organismic items. ExM so far has focused on extending cognitive phenomena, such as states of dispositional belief, and processes of planning and calculation. The aim of the second talk is to expand the scope of ExM by considering the case for extended affectivity, both dispositional and occurrent. It will be argued that proponents of ExM should also accept that the vehicles of emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits can extend beyond skull and skin.

The third presentation also offers a preliminary defense of the hypothesis of extended emotions (HEE). In particular, two ways of parsing HEE will be specified: the hypothesis of bodily extended emotions (HEBE), and the hypothesis of environmentally extended emotions (HEEE). It will be argued that, while both HEBE and HEEE are empirically plausible, only HEEE covers instances of genuinely extended emotions. After introducing some further distinctions, support is given to one form of HEEE by appealing to different streams of empirical research—particularly work on music and emotion regulation. However, skepticism about a second and more radical form of HEEE is also registered.

## Extended Emotion Regulation

*Joel Krueger, University of Exeter, United Kingdom*

I defend the thesis that the physical basis of some emotions may extend beyond the head. I motivate this thesis by looking at the interrelation between emotion *experience* and emotion *regulation*. I argue that some regulatory processes consist of world-involving loops spanning brain, body, and environment. I also argue that the phenomenal character of some emotions is constituted by world-involving regulatory processes—and that emotional consciousness can thus be said to extend. In support of these claims, I consider musically extended emotions and interpersonally extended emotions. I also consider cases where external regulatory resources are somehow compromised or missing altogether (psychopathology, solitary confinement).

# C3 Emotions & the Arts 1

## The Importance of Moods and Expressiveness for the Cinematic Experience

*Susanne Schmetkamp, University of Basel, Switzerland*

In my paper I want to discuss the interrelation between moods and altruistic emotions like empathy and sympathy and their significance for a aesthetic experience. Strictly speaking, I would like to explain it by using the example of films.Hereby, I will focus on the expressive and multisensual character of films. As some cognitivist film theorists have recently shown, it is not just the narrative content that is crucial for the emotional engagement and understanding of the work, but also the form of the film as a complex of sound, image, lighting, movement, camera angle, time, editing, and music. Emotions and moods play a crucial role here insofar as we are not only affected on a narrative but also on an expressive level. We can feel into the mood of a film with different emotional engagements and bodily senses which are affected by the expressiveness. My aim is to show how emotional engagement, narration and expression are interrelated in the cinematic experience.

## Hearing Emotion in Music: Empathy? Contagion? Subjective Response?

*Deniz Peters, University of Music and Performing Arts Graz, Austria*

The sadness, desolation, euphoria, aggression, solace, hope, pride, and other emotions, moods and attitudes we hear in diverse works of music appear to emerge from the works’ performed instantiations and in us. But works of music are non-sentient. Whose emotions are they? The composer’s? The performer’s? A musical persona’s? Our own? These questions and the larger questions of whether and how music communicates emotions have intrigued philosophers of music for centuries. Many of the existing views regard musical expression as related to bodily expression, conceiving our experience of emotion in music as analogous to seeing emotion in another’s facial or gestural expression. In Jerrold Levinson’s words: “Music [invites] the listener to hear it [...] as expression, by persons, of inner states through outer signs” (Contemplating Art, 2006:92).

While the expressive body explicitly plays a mediatory role in these and other approaches, it is treated as a sign and thus a cognitive representation. But what about the listener’s body’s contribution to the very individuation of a specific emotion in individual (musical) experience? The overintellectualisation of emotional experience in standard concepts of emotion has led some music philosophers to bracket the listener’s body’s co-constitutive role, so that musical experience seems solely a matter of cognitive response to the auditory experience, a matter of musical ‘understanding’ (after which it might lead to an empathetic emotional response). Others, embracing a Neo-Jamesian definition of emotion as perceptions of bodily changes, have gone to the other extreme, treating the body (and a sort of bodily contagion unfolding via cognitive representations of the body) as the exclusive source of the listener’s emotional experience.

As I argue in this paper, recent philosophical advances to the concept of emotion concerning the intertwinement of the somatic and cognitive aspects of a given emotion (e.g. Goldie 2000; 2010), permit a reconsideration of how we come to hear emotion in music, and whose emotion it is that we are hearing. I argue that (1) to hear emotions in music is grounded in our embodied knowledge from the everyday experience of the qualitative link between how actions sound and how those same actions feel in tactile and proprioceptive terms; that (2) in listening to music we engage this knowledge by listening from the body, a kind of interested listening that does not bracket out the felt aspects of the sonic experience which are suggestive of the felt aspects of emotions; and that (3) from there our listening experience – coloured by our bodily individuation and imaginative inclinations – may become nuanced or altered via empathetic acts directed towards performers, composers, imagined personae, and even co-listeners. Music, on this view, does not communicate emotion, but instead offers a modality for shared emotional experience. The experience of musically expressed emotion, I argue, is grounded in a subtle form of imaginative self-expression, one in which this self is questioned by the sonically composed and performed tactile realm; the experience may be additionally shaped by empathy with those who bring forth that realm.

## Aesthetic Transformation of Affect by Abject-Art

*Christiane Voss, Potsdam University, Germany*

# D1 Emotions & Rationality

## Happiness and Emotional Rationality

*Tom Cochrane, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom*

One of the banner results of the positive psychology movement concerns what is known as ‘gratitude training’. Gratitude training requires that every evening, the individual writes down five things for which they are grateful. Repeated studies have confirmed that this simple activity significantly boosts the self-reported happiness of individuals, and has a sustainable effect in the long term (e.g. Wood et al. ‘Gratitude and well-being.’ Clinical Psychology Review, 30/7).

The problem with gratitude training however, is that it effectively inculcates a cognitive bias in the individual. The process works because one does not simply adjust one’s perspective at the time of writing one’s list, but develops an everyday habit of seeing the world as meriting gratitude. Consider in relation to this various studies confirming that inducing happy emotions can make individuals more prone to attributing success to their own efforts when this is not the case (e.g. Tan & Forgas ‘When happiness makes us selfish, but sadness makes us fair’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46/3).

Of course, gratitude training is partly justified by the consideration that our perspective is already biased, by for instance the daily news, towards seeing how badly things are going. Thus from the standpoint of developing a more balanced and justifiable outlook on the world, most of us probably ought to be more grateful for our lot than we are.

Yet genuine emotional rationality seems to recommend not that we programme ourselves with a contrary bias, but try to rid ourselves of biases entirely. Indeed, I will suggest that emotional rationality is maximized not by having any fixed evaluative stance, but by frequent reflective self-consciousness of one’s current emotional state, where this involves having thoughts of the kind, “I am feeling x because of y… is it right that I feel this?” This kind of awareness is a useful corrective against petty emotional distresses, since it makes one more aware of how one’s current reactions align with one’s wider value priorities.

The key problem is that emotional self-consciousness seems not to be conducive to happiness, even though it may well be rational for you to be happy, at least sometimes. Emotional self-consciousness detaches one from absorption within negative emotional episodes, but it also detaches one from absorption within positive emotional episodes. This is particularly worrying given the emphasis on states of absorption in recent works on happiness, most particularly Daniel Haybron’s The Pursuit of Unhappiness (2008). Haybron further stresses the fact that humans are rather bad at deliberately making themselves happy. These kinds of consideration suggest that a bit of self-programming of the kind that gratitude training recommends is precisely the sort of self-control required for human flourishing. Thus all things considered, the most rational thing for one to do may be to limit episodes of maximal rationality. I will examine the extent to which this recommendation is feasible.

## Memory, Imagination, and the Correspondence Theory of Emotional Rationality

*Scott Howard, Harvard University, United States*

In this paper I argue that an uncontroversial implication of our model of episodic memory has controversial consequences for our model of emotional rationality. Episodic memory—experiential rather than merely propositional remembering—is widely understood to be a ‘constructive’ phenomenon that draws on suppositions, present-day attitudes, and imagination to depict the past. This allows for various forms of distortion: episodic memories fall on a spectrum with veridicality at one end and confabulation at the other. There are also mental states that fall midway between faithful and fictitious representations of the past. I will call mnemonic states with significant imaginary input, hybrid states. A prominent example is the sort of memory which, although it depicts a real event, has undergone certain qualitative changes, appearing brighter, denser, or more symbolic of a past era than it did when it was present.

Many of our emotions are directed at episodic memories, including these hybrid states. Sometimes, our past-directed emotions are occasioned by the very elements that have been imaginatively altered. My case study of such an emotion is nostalgia, which typically targets memories that seem more whole, pure, or otherwise enhanced than the original experience would have seemed at the time. Yet when one becomes aware of these imaginary elements, one’s emotion is not necessarily extinguished. Instances of such ‘reflective’ nostalgia present us with an evaluative puzzle: how should we regard the rationality of someone who longs for a past they admit was relevantly different from the way they now picture it?

For help, we may turn to what I call the correspondence theory of emotional rationality. On this theory, any emotion episode is representationally correct when its object, as it is represented by the emotion’s cognitive base (e.g. a perception, belief, memory, or imagining), genuinely possesses the emotion’s criterial property or formal object. In short, emotional correctness is a matter of having one’s emotional evaluations correspond to the world. Most philosophers restrict their articulation of the theory to this schematic form. But when we try to apply it to emotions directed at hybrid states, the picture becomes much more complicated.

The correspondence theory suggests that an emotion is only fully representationally correct on the condition that its cognitive base is representationally correct (e.g. the perception must be veridical, the belief true, and so on). But the correctness conditions for a hybrid state are far from clear. Insofar as the representation is considered a memory, it is only correct if it is veridical; but insofar as it is an imagining, it can be correct while departing from reality. And if we cannot determine when the hybrid cognitive base is representationally correct, we cannot assess nostalgia’s correctness using the correspondence theory. After arguing that several solutions to this problem fail, I conclude that nostalgia is indeed a counterexample to the correspondence theory. This is significant not only because it challenges the dominant framework for assessing emotional rationality, but also because of its implications for our freedom to aestheticize our pasts.

## On Rational Emotions

*Georg Friedrich, RWTH Aachen University, Germany*

*Juana F. Chinchilla-Calero, UNED, Spain*

In this paper we argue that sometimes emotions can be rational. The main argument against the rationality of emotions is that emotions seem to surge up automatically. If something is automatic or occurs with necessity there no place for a rational consideration. The planets are neither rational nor irrational orbiting the sun. If you put your hand in the fire by accident and remove it immediately, you are actuating neither rational nor irrational because what occurs is a reflex. In both examples it does not make sense at all to speak from rationality. So whenever you consider rationality and irrationality, there are involved highly developed consciousness and a free agent. To be rational for an action means that considering all relevant facts you know the action will lead you to a desirable result. It would be rational to take an aspirin if you think this will quit your headache and it would be irrational to take the aspirin if you think that it is ineffective. It would be rational to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius if you think that this way you can thank the goodness. Of course there is a difference between rational actions and rational emotions. To be rational for an emotion means that the person having the emotion has to have some although limited influence over the course the emotion in question takes. Basic emotions are fear, anger, disgust, happiness and sadness and at first appearance they surge up automatically. William James tells a story similar to the following example with the bear. Imagine that you are walking through the woods and suddenly you come across a grizzly bear. It is plausible to think that immediately you feel fear. Imagine that you watch a football match on TV and your favorite team scores a goal. It is plausible to think that immediately you feel happiness. It is plausible but it is not the whole story. Imagine that not you are walking through the woods but Allan Quatermain. Before the appearance of fear he will take in consideration that he has already faced a lot of beast and the grizzly will not harm him. So instead of fear he possibly will feel indifference or surprise. As far as the second example is concerned, imagine that your favorite football team usually loses and being aware of that fact before match you bet against your team. So if your team wins this time you will not feel happiness but anger; a psychologically very interesting case. It seems that emotions don‘t surge up so automatically. It is true that there are normal reactions. Most people feel fear when they come across a grizzly and most people feel happy when their favorite football team wins. That’s the reason why it seems that emotions surge up automatically but the examples have shown that previous to the emotion there is an evaluation of the situation. This evaluation is the place for rationality.

# D2 Emotions & Morality 1

## Schadenfreude and the Sense of Self-Righteousness

*Andreas Dorschel, Academy of Music, Graz, Austria*

How closely is schadenfreude connected to a sense of self-righteousness: the sure feeling that you are right and the other is wrong? What sort of connection, if any, is that? Does that sense, e.g., constitute a necessary, though not sufficient condition of schadenfreude? Answers to these questions have sometimes been assumed in the literature on the subject without much scrutiny; the purpose of the paper will be to examine them closely. In particular, I shall engage with Richard H. Smith’s theory of schadenfreude, as set out in his recent The Joy of Pain: Schadenfreude and the Dark Side of Human Nature (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).

## Feeling bad and Seeing bad

*Michael Brady, University of Glasgow, United Kingdom*

The emotions of guilt, shame, disappointment, and grief, and the bodily states of pain and suffering, have something in common, at least phenomenologically: they are all unpleasant, they feel bad. But how might we explain what it is for some state to feel bad or unpleasant? What, in other words, is the nature of negative affect? In this paper I want to consider the prospects for evaluativist theories, which seek to explain unpleasantness by appeal to negative evaluations or appraisals. In particular, I want to consider versions of evaluativism which seek to explain negative affect in terms of a kind of negative perceptual experience. These views thus attempt to explain feeling bad in terms of seeing bad. Now the most prominent evaluativist accounts of negative affect have been developed in the pain literature, and so my paper will primarily be focused on the question of whether evaluativism can provide a plausible account of the painfulness or unpleasantness of pain. I will argue that evaluativism faces serious objections on this score. Since I assume that my conclusions can be extended to cover negative affect more generally, then evaluativist accounts of negative affect as such are problematic. I maintain, then, that we have good reason to reject the idea that we can explain feeling bad in terms of seeing bad.

In the second part of the paper I make a positive proposal about the shape that a ‘relational’ account of painfulness in particular, and of negative affect in general, should take, in light of these criticisms of evaluativism. In my view, relational accounts should appeal, not to negative evaluations to explain feeling bad, but to dislike. Dislike is a con-attitude that (i) lacks representational content, (ii) is (thereby) not subject to rational criticism, but (iii) can (nevertheless) generate reasons and motives. I show how these features enable a relational account based upon disliking pain sensations can avoid the criticisms that undermine evaluativism, and capture the normative and motivational force that pain in particular, and negative affect in general, is thought to have.

## Consolation - an Unrecognized Emotion?

*Eva Weber-Guskar, Georg-August-Universitat Gottingen, Germany*

Traditionally consolation is not thought of as an emotion. It is not mentioned in any of the classical lists of passions nor in contemporary publications. But at the same time consolation belongs without doubt in some way to the realm of emotions. So it seems worth taking a second look and asking: Is consolation (the feeling of being consoled, not the act of consoling) an emotion? My answer will be: yes, in a contemporary theoretical frame, the phenomenon of consolation can very well be described in terms of emotions. This result should be elucidating both for a better understanding of consolation itself and for insights in what consequences a change of emotional theories can involve.

As said, consolation is obviously missing in classical as well as contemporary lists of emotions (Newmark 2008, 225 ff., Demmerling/ Landweer 2007, VII ff.). Why is this so? There is a reason for classical lists: They may be influenced by the stoic view that, very roughly, emotions are disturbances of the soul and consolation is the regained tranquility of the soul – that is, consolation is in a way the contrary of an emotion (cf. for the stoic theory of emotions Graver 2007). But, in my view, there is no such reason in a contemporary theory of emotions. If we are not forced by a theoretical frame to think of consolation as the dissolution of emotions, a phenomenological analysis makes it plausible, in a first step, to think of consolation as an emotion of its own.

Someone who just lost her partner in a car accident is in deep grief and wants to find consolation. But this does not mean that she wants to overcome or resolve the grief immediately. Rather, what she is looking for is a way to cope with the grief and that is, to alter the grief not to make it just vanish. Here we have a first description of what consolation is: An altered or coped with grief. This has to be spelled out in terms of emotions, as a second step, so that we can see consolation as an emotion itself.

In the following I argue from the assumption that emotions are qualitatively experienced attitudes in which we grasp something in the world as in some way important to us (Weber-Guskar 2009, 35 f., 255). This means each emotion is characterized by a certain phenomenology, a certain intentionality and some motivation to action. I will show how to fill in these criteria for consolation thereby distinguishing the state of consolation from that of grief on the one hand and the of totally overcome or resolved grief on the other hand. Consolation is feeling something or someone as diminishing one’s misery. The object of the emotion (more precisely, the “target”, cf. Helm 1994) can be another person, for religious people God or for other the experience of an artwork. Considering the ways and methods of real consoling (not relativizing the misery, not talking about substitution of a loss, but hint for example to what is left in life) supports this idea of consolation.

# D3 Emotion Regulation 2

## Emotional Rationality and Prudent Emotional Regulation

*Alison Kerr, The Ohio State University, United States*

There is a fairly wide spread consensus that emotions can be rational in some way or other. I aim to contribute a way of thinking of emotions as rational that pertains to how we regulate our emotions. I argue that successful emotion regulation is a crucial feature in emotional rationality. More generally, successful emotion regulation is also crucial to leading a good emotional life—studies have shown that emotion regulation is closely connected to mental health, physical health, relationship satisfaction, and work performance.

Research on emotion regulation in affective science has consequences for an understanding of various aspects of emotions—including, the norms of assessments that we use for deciding whether various emotion episodes are acceptable, reasonable, justified, or rational. Thus far, psychologists’ discussions concerning emotion regulation have not received much in the way of explicit treatment in the philosophical literature on emotions. I argue that there are many important philosophical, issues connected to emotion regulation. I focus on assessments of emotions that are associated with emotion regulation.

An individual’s emotions can be assessed as wrong or inappropriate in a handful of distinct ways that have been discussed widely in emotion literature within philosophy. These discussions tend to focus on assessments of particular emotion tokens. Sometimes, however, an agent’s emotions are wrong or inappropriate because they fit into a problematic pattern and it is by focusing on patterns that we can use insights from the psychology of emotion regulation. In what follows, I discuss how a pattern of emotions can be problematic in a way that causes a significant negative impact on one’s life, and which has not been given the attention is deserves in the emotion literature. When emotions are problematic in this way, I will say that they are imprudent. I argue that we can and should criticize one another for feeling imprudent emotions; moreover, we already do engage in criticisms of this sort. And, these critical practices are justified in part because we can regulate our emotions in order to reduce imprudence. I employ results from research on emotion regulation to help defend these claims and the significance of the results. Ultimately, I offer a theory of the rationality of emotions that has to do with successful emotion regulation and relies heavily on the emotion regulation literature.

## Can we explain Counterfactual Emotions through Enactivism?

*Alberto Murcia, Carlos III University, Spain*

*Mercedes Rivero, Carlos III University, Spain*

If we differentiate between reactive emotions (or feelings) –i.e. anger, and narrative emotions –i.e. love, some kind of that narrative emotions, as resentment, only should be arise by counterfactual thinking (CT). In order to feel a counterfactual emotion we need to think about something happened in the past, evaluate that event, and conclude that it could be otherwise. So, timing of counterfactual emotions seems that we necessary need a rational calculus about the different consequences of the actions in a past situation. We feel resentment only if we think about the consequence of an event. Is that true? Can we feel resentment without CT?

We will suggest two different questions. First, narrative emotions, as a process, could be compatible with an enactive approach (because they occur without requiring that there be mental representations before). Second, even CT is itself a cognitive process that needs many years to be ready to be use properly –following Rafesteder and Pernel (2013) –we can give some evidence that when CT appears in pretend play –at eighteen-months more or less –, children are doing something that we call counterfactual behaviour; that means children enacts hypothetical situations –they do not are just doing an object swapping, as usually are described these actions. Therefore, cognitive resources needed for those activities are fewer than previously thought by some psychologists. In other words, we don’t need have a metarepresentational mind in order to engage in pretend play. Pretend play is closer to enactivism than cognitivism.

## Emotional Perception and Affective Valence

*José Manuel Palma, Universidad de Granada, Spain*

The aim of this paper is to propose an external model of emotional perception from which it can be easily derived the relational and intentional character of affect valence.

My proposal adopts an ecological starting point (Gibson, 1979) that conceives emotions as experiences in which agents perceive the way an object or event of the world affects them, and what their relationship with an aspect of the world is like. Emotions are perceptual experiences in which we appraise our relationship with our environment. The source of the perceptual appraisal of this relation is an active one. It focuses on how the agent explores and navigates along her world, on how she faces her environment during her practical interchanges with it. In this sense emotional experiences are perception of affordances, perception of paths or course of actions. With emotions, an agent explores an emotionally structured surrounding world looking for affective cues that guide her (Author 1 & Author 2, 2013).

The logic of emotional perception statements is perceiving x-as-y. “X” stands for the object of the emotional perception, while “as-y” stands for the content or mode of presentation. Contrary to Internal Perceptual Models, with Jamesian inspiration (Prinz, 2004) ―now again main stream in emotion researches―, in which emotions are considered perception of some kind of neurophysiological processes, I propose endorsing an External Perceptual Model. An emotion is then primarily defined as a perception of external objects and events of the world. This means that emotional experiences are intentional or directed towards aspects of the world, not the self ―body or mind―. Neither neurophysiological changes nor mental states are the objects of emotions; they are the proper answer to questions about the content of emotions.

Among the several ingredients that give emotional experiences their particular flavors (psychological states and behavioral properties of agents, affordances recognition, and so on), are valenced core affect properties (Barrett, 2006). Core affect is the basic neurophysiological barometer of agents that represents their relationship with an environment. Core affect has a double dimension: (i) hedonicity/affect valence, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure of affective processes, on which I will concentrate, and (ii) arousal, the activation or deactivation that affects agent as consequence of those mechanisms. Contrary to internal theories, which in defining emotional feelings as perceptions of core affect conceive affect valence as internal attributes of agents, I propose that it should be considered an agent-environment relation’s property. In this way affect valence can be characterized as relational and intentional. Given that the level of attribution of these qualities is personal from the very starting point of our

analysis, not sub-personal or internal as in the preceding conception, we can easily derived these features.

Exemplifying these ideas, I focus on the proposal of Louis C. Charland (Charland; 2005). He understands affect valence as an experience, a property of consciousness, a second-order interpretation through focal attention of a first-order phenomenology. Later, affect valence is characterized as relational and intentional. I will show that, given his definition of emotional experiences, the intended characterization of affect valence does not follow. Within an internal model, it is not easy to account for the relational and intentional nature of affect valence.

# E1 Emotions & the Arts 2

## Neuroaesthetics and Literary Criticism: The Role of Emotions

*Lucia Fiorella, CAPA International Education, Italy*

Recent developments and outstanding research findings in neuroscience such as the mirror neurons have greatly impacted on contemporary thinking and led to a variety of more or less convincing applications in more subjective areas of study. A case in point is the so called ‘neuroaesthetics’, or neuroscientific reading of literary works, which purporting to foster a dialogue between the ‘two cultures’ has reduced literary criticism to a recording of the emotional effects produced on readers by literary texts, thus establishing a new version of post-structuralism: the supremacy of the text has given way to the supremacy of the readers’ brains – which is evidenced by common key-phrases such as “Studying the Reader” or “Empowering the Reader” frequently used in publications in this field.

Among other shortcomings (the most evident of which is the reduction of literariness to a body of highly emotional, highly figurative works, virtually indistinguishable from commercials or trash) neuroaesthetics fails to take into account the fictionality of any work of art, which entails (pace Samuel Taylor Coleridge) an only partial suspension of disbelief – we can enjoy a tragedy because we are comfortably sitting in the theatre armchairs; if we do weep, we know it is the result of a simulation, we may have gone there just to be emotionally stimulated, and these expectations should be taken into account in the overall appraisal of the audience’s emotional response. Moreover, in its pursuit (never openly acknowledged but clearly underlying) of the ‘objective’, ‘scientific’ artistry of a piece of literature substantiated by the readers’ functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) neuroaesthetics totally neglects all the socio-historical-economic transactions that for the large public establish what is art and what is not, which may deeply influence their individual emotional response.

My argument is that emotions do play a role in the appreciation of literature – but not only in the obvious and naïve sense that there are texts whose conative solicitude is pre-eminent, and empathic relation to characters is organized for readers through the adoption of specific expressive codes (think of Dickens’ pathetic traps and his frequent calls for action, for example). One of the distinguishing features of a work of art is the capacity to estrange and reshape the readers’ perception of the world – a sort of meta-emotional experience that may not necessarily entail bodily response, and that therefore may escape even the most sophisticated fMRI. In this respect, I certainly endorse Nussbaum’s theorization of emotions devoid of bodily response, which I believe may be consistently reconciled with Damasio’s as-if loop account of feelings that do not trigger bodily activity.

## Neuroaesthetics and Aesthetic Emotions

*Joerg Fingerhut, University of Stuttgart, Germany*

Neuroaesthetics engages in the project of identifying the networks and subsystems of the brain that are involved in the experience and evaluation of art. In my paper I will review some of these attempts whose common dominator is a version of sentimentalism in the appreciation of art: when subjects are asked to judge artworks aesthetically it can be shown that beyond sensorimotor areas especially core emotional centers as well as reward-related centers are involved (see the reviews in Brown et al. 2011; Cela-Conde et al. 2011).

That we primarily consult our emotions when evaluating works of art has also been argued by Jesse Prinz (using neuroaesthetic studies as one line of evidence). He even goes beyond a simple sentimentalism and identifies “wonder” as the specific emotion employed in art appreciation (Prinz 2011). Wonder is not a sui generis emotion for aesthetic features but one that has evolved to track the core relation theme of “the extraordinary”. Wonder also is a blended emotion and therefore not easily identifiable, which accounts for the fact that it yet has not been prominently addressed.

I will discuss Prinz’ account and propose an alternative way to assess the role of emotions in our encounters with works of art; i.e. not by highlighting one specific emotion that might be underlying all our aesthetic evaluations, but rather by identifying a certain way (or mode) in which different emotions are employed in aesthetic engagements. I argue that in aesthetic appreciation we re-assess these specific modes of emotional-bodily engagement. This approach is based on empathic-embodied models of aesthetic experiences (especially of visual art) that claim that such experiences are necessarily medieated by universal, neuronal mechanisms of embodied simulation (Freedberg/Gallese 2007; Gallese/Di Dio 2012).

Although Freedberg/Gallese do specify necessary mechanisms that explain how we become emotionally engaged with objects, they only insufficiently account for the differences between everyday situations and encounters with art. I argue that by characterizing aesthetic experience as encompassing two psycho-physiological elements – that of an embodied interaction as well as that of an inhibition of certain kinds of actions – one can avoid this shortcoming. I claim that this focus on inhibition should be part of every characterization of the ways an emotion unfolds. I will briefly highlight the benefits of such a way of construing aesthetic emotions in particular by reviewing its applicability with regard to two examples: (1) “constructed situations” by Tino Sehgal (that make the switch from a “normal” stance to and aesthetic stance the topic of the artwork) and (2) the empathic-emotional engagement with videos of Rosemarie Trockel.

As I will finally argue, although this is not a theory of aesthetic emotions in the sense Prinz had proposed, it nonetheless accounts for the neurophysiological data as well as he does. This account includes emotions as a key player in aesthetic experience (and therefore as a central element in evaluation of art), but it does not identify one emotion that underlies all aesthetic evaluations.

## Cognitivism and Emotivism in Philosophy of Music

*David Bitter, New York University, Hungary*

Music has a very apparent capacity to express or evoke affect. Accordingly, most people readily describe a piece or passage of music with emotive terms, and the musically lay are nearly as good as the musically trained in identifying the alleged affective character of music.

The seemingly close relationship between music and affectivity gives rise to a host of questions each of which invites a ‘cognitivist’ or an ‘emotivist’ answer. For example, one might ask whether our attributions of affectivity depend on music’s capacity to evoke feelings in us. Cognitivist answers to such questions are negative: they deny or downplay the existence or role of musically expressed or evoked affect. Emotivist answers are affirmative: they assert or emphasize the existence or role of musically expressed or evoked affect.

Superficial similarities of the answers that they invite notwithstanding, a conflation of the questions around which cognitivist-emotivist debates revolve lead to various confusions about the content and relations of cognitivist and emotivist positions. So what are the issues and how do they relate? The purpose of this paper is to sort this question out.

I identify a total of seven issues, all of which I argue are logically distinct. These issues might be presented in the form of questions that cluster around four general themes:

A. Natural expressiveness

Q1: Is the relation between certain attributions of expressiveness and certain musical features non-arbitrary?

B. Musical understanding and aesthetic appreciation

Q2: Is an understanding or appreciation of musical expressiveness integral to a full understanding or appreciation of music?

Q3: Is an understanding or appreciation of musical expressiveness integral to an understanding or appreciation of the formal properties of music?

C. Perceived vs. evoked affect

Q4: Is perception or attribution of certain musical expressiveness a function of non-inferentially evoked (affective) states?

Q5: Is perception or attribution of certain musical expressiveness a function of evoked conscious affect?

Q6: Is perception or attribution of musical expressiveness a function of music’s capacity to evoke affect?

D. The value of music

Q7: Do we value music for its capacity to evoke affect?

Issues that belong to different clusters are completely orthogonal. Issues within clusters stand in unidirectional entailment relations with each other. For example, a cognitivist (negative) answer to Q2 entails a cognitivist (negative) answer to Q3, and an emotivist (affirmative) answer to Q5 entails an emotivist (affirmative) answer to Q6. It is crucial that these relations don’t hold the other way around. For it is the crux of my argument that the identified issues are all logically distinct. So I claim that in no case is there a relation of bidirectional entailment between a position assumed vis-à-vis one issue, and a position assumed with respect to another.

The upshot is that philosophical theories of musical affect are not confined to ‘pure’ cognitivism or emotivism. Indeed, there is plenty of logical space for ‘hybrid’ positions. Hopefully, my analysis also sheds light on some general issues of affectivity and expressiveness, and hence my conclusions have implications both within and without the philosophy of music.

# E2 Emotions & the Self 1

## Self-Awareness and the Meta-Emotion of Surprise

*Dina Mendonça, University of Lisbon, Portugal*

The paper builds upon previous work regarding the nature of meta-emotion and explores the role of surprise on self-awareness. There are metaemotions when emotions are about emotions, and they are layered instead of sequential such as when someone is sad about their jealousy their sadness is a meta-emotion. To deepen the claim that meta-emotions are an important part of the general reflexivity of human beings, the presentation looks into the role of the metaemotion of surprise for self-awareness. I show that there are many instances when we are surprised by our own emotions (such as when we feel akratic feelings) and using Gallagher’s insights on the distinction between agency and ownership point out some of the ways in which we can feel surprise even when we are expecting to feel certain emotions. The point of focusing on the metaemotion of surprise is not to work out all of its aspects, details and function but see how it requires, demands, hides its connection to the self, ultimately indicating how it forces self-awareness and some of the ways in which it becomes visible. Finally, the paper ends with pointing out how the proposed role of the metaemotion of surprise on the self can foster transparency and opacity of emotions, and concludes with how it reveals the important emotional ability of identifying how details matter for emotional processes.

## The Ambivalence of Reflexive Fear

*Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, University of Tuebingen, Germany*

Fear (in the broader sense) is the awareness of some repulsive possibility. Usually, this possibility is taken to be something that might happen to us, a possible course of events. We experience ourselves as passive objects confronted with repulsive possibilities lying within the world, beyond our own power. I refer to these kinds of fear as “non-reflexive” or “world-directed” fears. But there is another class of fears which is rarely recognized in recent (analytic) philosophy of emotions: “reflexive” or “self-directed” fears. In these kinds of fear we experience ourselves as agents confronted with repulsive possibilities lying within our own power (cf. Kierkegaard 1980; Sartre 1941). We are afraid of actions we might perform. This seems to be paradoxical: Why should we be afraid of an action we might perform, if the performance of that action completely lies within our own power? Why do not we simply refrain from doing so? Or, in other words: How is reflexive fear possible?

My paper makes a significant contribution to our understanding of this common and fascinating, but yet insufficiently recognized phenomenon. I will argue that reflexive fear can be understood as an awareness of one’s own looming weakness of will (cf. Davenport 2001), which gives us an important insight into how we understand ourselves. In order to be intelligible as a phenomenon of fear, reflexive fear has to meet two conditions: Firstly, it has to be a genuinely ambivalent phenomenon: We are confronted with a possible course of action which attracts us and at the same time repels us. The analysis of reflexive fear therefore is of interest for the debate about ambivalent valences of emotions. Secondly, our feeling of repulsion has to dominate over our feeling of attraction; our experience of powerlessness in the face of the action we might perform has to dominate over our experience of power. This domination reflects the way we understand ourselves. Two widely discussed dimensions of our self-understanding are being a rational being acting out of (better) reasons understood as (better) reasons and being a self-evaluating being acting out of wishes wished to be realized (higher-/highest order volitions (cf. Frankfurt 1988)). Given these kinds of self-understanding, by holding the judgement or higher-order volition not to perform the action we take up a stance in favour of refraining from the action. But in our experience of reflexive fear we realize that acting contrary to our better judgement or higher-order volition is still an open possibility for us. The ambivalence of reflexive fear turns out to reflect our ambivalent understanding of who or what we are: the experience of self-determination is contrasted by the experience of the “indisposability” and contingency of ourselves (cf. Schechtman 2004; Rudd 2012).

## The Emotional Engagement of the Self with Fiction

*Jérôme Pelletier, Institut Jean-Nicod, France*

Emotion in fiction, emotion in real: is there here a distinction to draw? And if it is the case, is it a distinction of kind or of degree? I suggest that cognitive psychology and neuroscience may help to answer these philosophical questions. On this basis, I defend the claim that there is a distinction between emotion in fiction and emotion in real and that the way the self is involved in the emotional experience may constitute the basis of the distinction.

When a narrative is judged to be fictional, a ‘fictional frame’ is installed. This ‘fictional frame’ modulates the way cognitions and emotions are processed. At the cognitive level, the ‘fictional frame’ explains that readers or spectators of the narrated events imagine without believing the narrated events. At the emotional level, the ‘fictional frame’ installs an emotional frame of personal detachment. The emotional frame of personal detachment explains why so often we are not moved by fictional narratives. The ‘fictional frame’ explains also that when emotion in fiction happens, the emotional experiences have the peculiar characteristic of engaging the emotional system in relation to content appraised as non self-relevant.

I present data from cognitive neuroscience supporting the claim that the cognitive and perceptual processing of fictional representations deactivates the ‘personal relevance system’. I present arguments to support the claim that these data are relevant to understand the specific nature of emotion in fiction. Finally I propose a way of construing the phenomenological property of ‘non-personal relevance’ of emotion in fiction. To that end, I import a technical notion from cognitive psychology of memory, ‘semantisation’, a notion which refers to a process by which episodic memories (memories of personal events and experiences) may become gradually ‘semantised’, that is remembered as facts, like semantic memories. ‘Semantisation’ in memory induces a phenomenological qualitative difference in the self-engagement. When one ‘semantically’ remembers personal past events, one experiences a ‘detached’ way of relating to one’s personal past experiences. In the same way, when one engages with a fictional representation, one experiences a kind of detached way of relating to one’s representations and emotional experiences of the fictional content.

# E3 Individual Papers

## Practical and Pathetic Reasons to Feel

*Justin D'Arms, Ohio State University, United States*

Can we have reasons to feel various emotions, such as anger at an insult or fear at a threat? In the capacious sense of ‘reason’, a reason is a consideration that counts in favor of something. And certainly there are things that can count in favor of being afraid or angry. But there are things that can count in favor of having short hair too, and so in that sense you can have a reason to have short hair. Your reason to have short hair, I will say, is a practical reason: it is a reason to do things to bring it about that your hair is short, or to maintain your hair in its already short state. Clearly, we can also have reasons to bring it about that we are afraid or angry. In certain contexts, these states can help us achieve desirable outcomes. Practical reasons in the sense I am describing are defined by what they are reasons for: intentional actions.

What about the fact that someone has deliberately insulted you? Is that a reason to be angry with him? I think in many normal cases it is. Is it a practical reason—a reason to do something to bring about or maintain anger? I think that it is a practical reason but that it is not only a practical reason. It is also what I will call a pathetic reason, which is a reason to feel directly. That is, it is a reason that counts in favor of forming an emotional response unintentionally, as we normally form emotional responses. So I am distinguishing two kinds of activities: feeling directly and bringing about feelings. Corresponding to those activities are two kinds of reason, pathetic and practical. We can then ask how we should think about the relation between these activities and some different kinds of justification one might try to give for an emotion, where the different sorts of justification are differentiated by their content. Some justifications are pragmatic—it would be good for you to be afraid. Others are what are often called reasons of ‘fit’, such as the consideration that someone has insulted you deliberately, understood as a reason for anger. It would be neat if pragmatic considerations were practical reasons and not pathetic reasons, and considerations of fit were pathetic reasons but not practical reasons. Some moral philosophers seem to believe something like that is the case. Unfortunately, I do not think things are quite so neat, and so I will argue in this talk. Considerations of fit are both practical and pathetic reasons, I will argue. And so are some ethical considerations about how it would be best to feel.

Time permitting, the relation between these issues and some seemingly parallel issues about pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief can also be considered. It turns out that the parallels are not as tight as might be supposed. And the breakdown of the parallelism provides an interesting window onto issues about cognitivism in the philosophy of emotion.

## Coping with Emotions. A New Hypothesis on the Function of Prehistoric Cave Paintings

*Markus Wild, University of Basel, Switzerland*

Prehistoric cave paintings are fascinating and mysterious cultural achievements. They mostly depict animals (mammals). There are several competing theories about the function of these animal representations. In this talk it will be argued that the general purpose of cave paintings is the simulation of situations involving intense interaction with large mammals. More specifically, cave paintings are part of complex arrangements simulating emotional arousal and, thus, allow to practice coping with emotions, both personal and social.

## What is an Emotion? Rereading William James

*Heleen Pott, EUR/UM, Netherlands*

Emotions are ‘feelings of bodily changes’, according to William James in Mind (1884). His claim, updated in The Principles of Psychology (1890), would provoke more controversy than any other view on emotion. Much of emotion research in the past hundred years has been a critical commentary to James’s ideas. More than once, the ‘James-Lange theory’- as his view is generally referred to - was declared refuted by the results of experimental research (Cannon 1927; Schachter & Singer 1962). The theory has been sharply and repeatedly criticized by psychologists and philosophers for reducing emotion to a non-cognitive physiological reflex and dismissing its intentionality (Dixon 2003) – most recently by Scherer & Deonna in ‘The Intentional Object Disappearing Act’, in Emotion Review 2010. But surprisingly, the Jamesian theory of emotions seems to rise time and again from its ashes again. Since the 1990s, we have witnessed its steady revival in the work of ‘neo-Jamesians’ like neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999, 2003) and philosopher Jesse Prinz (2004). From a completely different perspective, Matthew Ratcliffe (2008) has argued that James’s work on emotions shows interesting parallels with philosophical views of embodied consciousness as defended, for example, in existential phenomenology by Merleau-Ponty. Anno 2014, James’s approach of emotions appears to be more alive and kicking than ever. In this paper I examine James’s impact on current debates in emotion research. My purpose is, first, to show that standard readings of James’s ‘feelings of bodily changes’ are incorrect, and that there exist major discrepancies between James’s intentions and what most of his critics and admirers think he has meant. Second, I will show that rereading his writings on (both ‘coarse’ and ‘subtle’) emotions in the context of 1. his philosophical pragmatism, as well as 2. his evolutionary based empirical psychology, can help to clarify a number of controversial issues in today’s emotion debate, and give some direction as to how we should integrate philosophical and scientific approaches. Moving beyond the head/body, cognition/feeling, subjective/objective, active/passive dichotomies that characterize much of emotion theory in the 20th century, James anticipated several of the trends and breakthroughs in research over the past decades. He is a precursor of theories that view emotion as a form of ‘action readiness’ (Frijda 1986; 2007), and shares with current ‘enactivism’ the dynamic model of affective self-regulation (Colombetti & Thompson 2005). Implicit in his – unsystematic and incomplete - account of emotion is the revolutionary intuition that the structure of consciousness is fundamentally affective. ‘Feelings of bodily changes’ may prove to be the missing link in the development of an empirically responsible philosophy of the human mind, and how it relates to the world.

# F1 Philosophy & Emotion Science 1

## Emotions as Reflections of Situations

*Matthew Crippen, American University in Cairo, Egypt*

In “Holistic person processing: Faces with bodies tell the whole story,” Aviezer and colleagues (2012) reported experiments showing “that faces and bodies are processed as a single unit,” so that body language affects how we perceive facial expressions. However, while adding much to our understanding, this is not the whole story, for as filmmakers have long recognized, the contexts in which we encounter bodies and faces also bears on the appearance of emotional expression.

Following the lead of filmmakers, I conducted casual experiments involving the “Kuleshov effect”—a phenomenon wherein audiences perceive different emotions on faces when identical shots of performers are contextualized differently. I did so, however, with a twist: I included subjects typically regarded as incapable of conveying facial expressions, for instance, Darth Vader. With support from psychologists such as Carroll and Russell (1996) and phenomenologically oriented thinkers such as Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, Schmitz and Böhme, I argue that perceiving emotional expression can be more a matter of seeing worldly relations reflected on faces and bodies than of registering an outward sign of an inward state, for we should otherwise be unable to explain how the faces of performers wearing masks can manifest expressions that change with changing situations.

The notion that worlds, as opposed to isolated faces, can be primary determinants of emotional expression suggests rethinking the view, which has received increasing support since the 1960s, that basic emotions such as fear and anger have fairly specific, universal and involuntary corresponding facial expressions (e.g., Tomkins & McCarter, 1964; Izard, 1971; Ekman, 1972; Buck, 1994; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin & Scyns, 2005). It further suggests rethinking the thesis, popularized by Ekman, that basic facial expressions cannot easily be faked, so that security personnel can learn to detect non-genuine expressions. I do not object to the thesis itself, though evidence is mounting against it (see Weinberger, 2010; Gendron, Mesquita & Barrett, 2013), but to the fact that professional and especially popular media promulgate it in ways that neglect frequent cases in which faces do not as much express as reflect emotional qualities of situations. Indeed, cases exist in which emotions are reflected on the faces of performers wearing masks.

Pragmatists have suggested that without interests, which are emotive in nature, we could not cognize or even perceive the world, and existentialists such as Heidegger have made a similar case. Combining this position with the fact that the manner in which we register elements within a field is determined by our perception of the whole, and relating these ideas to 20th century physics and the position that properties—including so-called “primary” ones—are effects of interrelationships, I conclude that emotional expressions that appear as a consequence of situational placement need not be illusions. Indeed, a speculative case can be made that they have the same ontological status as colour and other qualities of objects perceived in the world.

## The Blurry Boundary between Stereotyping and Evaluation in Implicit Cognition

*Alex Madva, University of California, Berkeley, United States*

*Michael Brownstein, New Jersey Institute of Technology, United States*

Does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit or unreported mental states? The relationship between explicit beliefs (stereotypes) and explicit feelings (evaluations) about social groups has long been a point of theoretical contention. David Amodio, Patricia Devine, and colleagues argue in series of papers that the distinction between stereotyping and evaluation is equally important in implicit social cognition[[1]](#footnote-2). They make three related claims: (1) implicit stereotypes (ISs) and implicit evaluations (IEs) constitute two separate constructs, which reflect different mental processes and neural systems; (2) ISs and IEs predict distinctive actions; and (3) interventions should combat IS and IE differently.

For example, in Amodio and Devine (2006), participants first took two distinctive implicit association tests (IATs): the standard evaluative race IAT (Eval-IAT), which measures automatic affective reactions to black and white faces; and a novel Stereotyping IAT (Stereo-IAT), which measures the automatic activation of racial stereotypes of, on the one hand, athleticism and rhythmicity, and, on the other, intelligence and unintelligence. They found that majorities of participants exhibited implicit stereotypical and evaluative biases, but that these biases were uncorrelated with each other. Amodio and Devine also showed the Eval-IAT and Stereo-IAT uniquely predicted distinctive actions. Participants with strongly negative IEs of blacks sat farther away from a black interlocutor, and rated a black student as less likeable based on a written essay, while participants with strong ISs described the black essay-writer in more stereotypical terms, and predicted that another black student would perform worse on an SAT-based task than on a sports-trivia task. On the basis of these and related studies, Amodio and Lieberman (2009) write, “our findings suggest that different prejudice reduction techniques are needed to target these two types of implicit bias.”

While this stream of research has illuminated important features of social cognition, we question these explicit claims and propose an alternative framework. First, we reconsider the meaning of the Stereo-IAT by arguing that Amodio and colleagues’ putatively neutral stereotypes (“intelligent” and “athletic”) are in fact affect-laden; we also argue that the Stereo-IAT is not equipped to capture the right *kind* of affect associated with common social stereotypes. Second, we argue that virtually all ISs are irreducibly evaluative and all IEs are “semantic,” in the sense that they stand in co-activating associative relations with concepts and beliefs. The heterogeneity of implicit biases is best conceived in terms of differences between particular “clusters” or “bundles” of semantic-affective associations, rather than between two broad types of association. These clusters differ in degree, rather than kind, of semantic and 2 affective content. We identify mediators and moderators of these differences in degree and conclude by explaining how our framework promises to improve the power of implicit measures of social attitudes and feelings as well as the design of effective interventions to combat discrimination.

## Towards an Integrative Concept of Interaffectivity. Emotions as Embodied Phenomena of Second Nature

*Dirk von Boetticher, University Medical Center, Germany*

Introduction

Mankind doesn’t live any more in Paradise. For whatever reasons - we have been expulsed from it, not alone but in pairs, and since then we have to live in common und to build up culture. Nietzsche termed human beings as the “not yet determined animals”. One can hold that humans only realize their anthropological nature by transcending their biological nature through the medium of culture, that can be referred to as second nature (McDowell). While animals may rely on instinct-driven behavior, humans are in need for other means to protect and orient themselves. These days, emotions – both as bodily, psychic, mental and moral phenomena – play a central role for the understanding of humans as the "not yet determined animals". Accordingly, the concept of emotion has become a key concept in various scientific disciplines, especially psychological medicine and philosophical anthropology. Yet depending on the theoretical context, the term is imbued with clearly distinct meanings.

Method

Drawing on the mentalization model posited by Fonagy et al. (2002) and the theory of strong evaluation advocated by C. Taylor (1989), this presentation critically explores emotion as a concept employed in psychological medicine and philosophical anthropology to account for the genesis and efficacy of the embodied self. The presentation subsequently discusses points of convergence between the two models in order to sketch out an integrative concept of emotions as intersubjectively generated phenomena (interaffectivity).

Discussion

Mentalization entails understanding of the actions of oneself and others on the basis of intentional mental states, such as wishes, feelings, and beliefs. The concept of mentalization combines psychoanalytic theorems with results of empirical infant research, Theory of Mind and neurobiology. It accounts in a detailed manner for the gradual acquisition of mentalization abilities as a function of the individual's relationship and attachment history. The starting-point for the development of the ability to mentalize is the infant’s emotional experience. Mentalization, emotionality and the self therefore are developing as part of an intersubjective process between the infant and the caregivers. This approach, however, devotes scant attention to moral aspects which are integral to philosophical anthropology’s conceptualization of emotion, as formulated in exemplary fashion by Taylor’s theory.

For Taylor, humans are characterised by the things in the world that have a meaning for them. Whatever has meaning is intersubjectively constituted and manifests itself in the form of feelings, which are always already engendered by evaluation. Situation, feeling, evaluation and language are mutually dependent. Morality therefore refers less to abstract principles than to concrete, though modifiable emotions. In Taylor’s theory, however, the individual interaction history by which morally evaluative emotions arise remains largely undefined.

Results

Intersubjectively situated emotional experience is central to both theories. A comparative critique of them may allow to delineate an integrative concept of interaffectivity and of emotions as embodied manifestations of second nature. The concept of second nature relies on the inextricably intertwined dynamics of the biological and cultural dimension within the embodied human subject.

# F2 Emotions in Existentialism

## Serial Feelings: Sartre's Theory of Emotions Reconsidered (Once More).

*Martin Hartmann, University of Luzern, Switzerland*

Sartre's theory of emotions has recently gained a level of attention among philosophers it had not enjoyed in the decades before. While almost all authors praise Sartre's theory of emotions for its originality and uniqueness of approach it is widely accepted that it is unsuccessful and faulty given present standards of philosophical analysis of emotions. In the following I will recapitulate some of these criticisms after having outlined Sartre's early *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*. I will do so in order to show that some of the criticisms can be rebutted or at least relativized by a closer reading of the *Sketch*. At the same time I would like to suggest that the *Sketch* still contains undiscovered philosophical potential.

## It's About Time: Heidegger on Affectivity Revisited

*Jan Slaby, Free University Berlin, Germany*

A number of philosophers working on emotion and affectivity have taken up aspects of Heidegger’s approach to ‘Befindlichkeit’, as most notably developed in Being and Time, into their own work. However, for the most part, they have done so in a manner that fails to appreciate the extent to which nearly everything Heidegger says about affectivity is profoundly entangled with the overall ontological undertaking in his opus magnum, and thus especially with 'time' as the horizon of all conceivable sense-making. Accordingly, what we mostly find is sketchy, partial and incomplete, often even somewhat distorted ‘Heideggerian’ approaches to affectivity, where 'time' figures in a marginal role at best. The aim of contribution is to take some steps toward alleviating this situation. I will draw the contours of a more encompassing treatment of Heideggerian affectivity, and I do so by chiefly focusing on temporality. Time, I endeavor to show, is the horizon against which affectivity takes on its character as a core enabling structure of human existence, and it is central to capturing also the concrete unfolding of specific affective comportments.

The talk will be structured as follows: In the first section, I will rehearse the central characteristics of Befindlichkeit (findingness) as outlined in the sections 29, 30 and 40 of Being and Time. Taken together with some illuminating remarks on moods in Heidegger’s lecture course on the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30), this provides what is up to now the standard reading of Heidegger on affectivity – a view certainly worthwhile in its own right, though radically incomplete. In the second section, I will discuss in general terms the temporal character of the care-structure (i.e. the mode of unfolding proper to human existence). This is what Heidegger elaborates in most of division II of Being and Time, and notably in sections 65-69. Only here, in what might be seen as the central – but also most difficult – sections of the book, the full sense of findingness is brought out and placed within its proper context of intelligibility: the finite, ecstatic and dynamic unfolding of ‘originary temporality’, which is radically different from and more basic than what is commonly assumed as ‘objective time’. The centerpiece of the explication of originary temporality is Heidegger’s reconception of death as that which enables human existence as finite being-possible. Against the background of this understanding of existential temporality as grounded in death, affectivity can be reinterpreted in a fairly straightforward manner as a fundamental way in which the past (‘beenness’) is weighing on the forward-looking comportments that make up the moment-to-moment unfolding of human existence. Crucially, this will reveal that and how affectivity, selfhood and the historicity of personal existence stem from the same dynamic dimension of originary temporality. The paper concludes by outlining the revisionary relevance of this result for philosophical theorizing of emotion.

## Anxiety and Guilt in the Philosophy of Dasein

*Hye Young Kim, Freie University of Berlin, Germany*

According to Heidegger’s unique interpretation of Dasein, Dasein is an entity that exists in the way that it takes its own Being as an issue for itself and somehow understands it. And this process of understanding is the existence of Dasein itself. One of the significant points of Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein lies in the fact, that the starting point of this existential process of understanding is the phenomenon of anxiety. Since anxiety has been playing an important role in existential philosophy, for instance, by Kierkegaard, it actually is not at all a new invention of Heidegger to relate this specific concept to the issues of existential philosophy. However, just like the concept of Dasein, Heidegger gives it a new name and tries to approach it from a different angle. He calls anxiety ‘the basic state-of-mind’ that brings Dasein into the ‘authentic’ understanding of its own Being. Once the possibility of the authentic understanding is disclosed to Dasein, it can be ‘guilty’ of its own Being. In this context, ‘being guilty’ means that Dasein is responsible for its own Being, which in essence relates to its understanding of itself. In the center of this process of understanding of Dasein through anxiety and guilt, the essential character of Dasein, i. e. the finite Being is placed. In other words, anxiety in this context is an anxiety that arises in the face of the possibility of death. And the guilt of Dasein implies its responsibility of its own finiteness, namely death. This responsibility does not indicate the possibility of choice of life or death, but the existential understanding of its own Being as a finite one. For Dasein, according to Heidegger, anxiety and guilt means the basis for its authentic and active, therefore free way of existing by understanding its own Being. Heidegger himself doesn’t refer these two concepts as ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’. They do not, however, relate to an intellectual or a rational process of understanding either. He instead calls anxiety ‘the-state-of-mind’ and guilt ‘the basis-Being’. By doing so, he must have intended to avoid confusions that could be caused by the common understanding of ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’, especially in relation to the concept of ‘understanding’ which he already applies in a different sense with his own existential interpretation. I reckon, that there are two problems in referring to these concepts as ‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’: 1. Definitions as well as the difference of these words ‘emotion’ and ‘feeling’ are ambiguous; 2. Anxiety and guilt as feelings are shadowed with a negative connotation that blurs the positive interpretation of Dasein as a free entity. Anxiety and guilt in Dasein’s existential understanding should be brought up as a separate issue in the framework of the philosophy of Dasein and reexamined in the context of study of emotions.

# F3 Symposium on The Sociality of Emotions 1

## Introduction: The Sociality of Emotions

*Christoph Demmerling, University of Marburg, Germany*

## The Creation of Atmospheres as a Social Practice

*Michael Siegel, Philipps University Marburg, Germany*

The concept of atmospheres, highlighted especially in the work of German phenomenologist Hermann Schmitz, aims to overcome the proposition that emotions are subjective states. Yet it still seems difficult to defend the claim that qualities are a property of the (social) world only with regard to bodily feelings. Drawing on accredited social practices concerned with the creation of atmospheres (such as architects or stage designers) seems a proper strategy to gain inter-subjective criteria for the ascription of qualities, thus amending the discussion about atmospheres with a pragmatist touch.

## Affective Intentional Community as a Matter of Caring with One Another

*H. Andres Sanchez Guerrero, University of Osnabrück, Germany*

## Corporeal Interactions, Emotional Contagion and Collective Feelings

*Hilge Landweer, Berlin Free University, Germany*

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# G1 Symposium on The Sociality of Emotions 2

## A New Conception of Socially Constructed Emotions

*Anna Welpinghus, Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, Germany*

I suggest a new conception of socially constructed emotions, or emotions as social kinds. This conception should meet two criteria: first, it should be compatible with a naturalistic framework; acknowledging that human minds are the product of evolution. Second, socially constructed emotions should refer to categories with projectable properties within the social sciences.

The thesis that categories must be projectable in order to be fruitful building blocks for scientific theories is at the heart of Paul Griffiths's psychoevolutionary approach to emotions (Griffiths 1997, Scarantino & Griffiths 2011). According to this approach, emotion terms (in science) refer to natural kinds. Natural kinds in the realm of emotions are homeostatic property clusters (Boyd 1999): an underlying mechanism ensures that the properties of some members of the kind are projectable to other members. Griffiths suggests that an emotion is a natural kind just in case its members share the same evolutionary history; that is, they form a cladistic category. Plausible candidates for natural kinds are basic emotions such as fear, happiness, anger or sadness (Ekman 1972).

Sally Haslanger (2012) characterizes the building blocks of theories in the social sciences as social kinds: categories with projectable properties in virtue of the social structure they are embedded in. Their natures are discovered by theories within the social sciences. Such theories refer to a distribution of resources, habitual ways of navigating through the social world and sets of related attitudes – together they form the social structure which provides a context for action.

A socially constructed emotion must have projectable properties in virtue of the social structure. Drawing from both Haslanger and Griffiths, I suggest the following conception of socially constructed emotions: they are homeostatic property clusters but the mechanism which ensures that the properties of an emotion cluster is a social mechanism. A social mechanism takes up the role descent plays for a cladistic natural kind. To assess whether this conception captures the way emotions are treated in the social sciences, I discuss a sociological theory of the late modern form of suffering from romantic love (Illouz 2012). Some phenomena Illouz describes fall under my conception of social kinds, for instance 'insecurity' (the need to receive reassurance from one's romantic partner).

My suggestion goes beyond an existing strategy to incorporate social influences into the psychoevolutionary approach. According to this strategy, emotions can be socially transmitted and yet be natural kinds in Griffiths's sense. If an emotion is subject to natural or sexual selection, it must be transmitted from parents to offspring, whether genetically, culturally or through some complex interplay (Griffiths 1997). For instance, Stefan Linquist (2007) suggests that some emotions, such as guilt and shame are likely transmitted both genetically and culturally, through socialization techniques. Therefore, they can be adaptations.

I argue that Griffiths's and Linquist's suggestion to incorporate social aspects into the psychoevolutionary approach is too limited to capture how emotions serve as building blocks within the social sciences. It is only plausible for some socially constructed emotions. Many social mechanisms which ensure that a category is projectable are not primarily transmitted from parents to their offspring. Thus, I suggest to extend the psychoevolutionary approach to individuating emotions: some emotions are natural kinds in virtue of social structures, which are not inherited from parents to offspring.

## Collective Emotions

*Kelly Hamilton, Macquarie University, Australia*

We often talk of groups having emotions. We say that sports fans are happy when their teams are victorious, that a neighbourhood is gripped by fear when a string of crimes occurs, or that a community is outraged at an injustice against it. Individuals report that “we” felt happy, scared, or angry about an event, referring to themselves and the others in their group. Despite this, the notion of collective emotion is often dismissed because, intuitively, we think that emotions must be experienced personally. Emotions are felt, and groups cannot feel. Only individuals can have feelings. I will argue that groups can have emotions, by arguing that individuals can come together to form a we-subject, such that a group can be the subject of an emotion. I will do so by exploring the collective intentionality literature. Margaret Gilbert and Hans Bernard Schmid both draw on this literature to offer accounts of collective guilt and shared grief respectively, and argue that groups of individuals can come together as a single subject of emotion. Gilbert offers a plural-subject account of collective guilt, arguing that individuals can come together to form joint commitments and can thus constitute a plural-subject. Once they have done this, the group can commit to having guilt (which is, on her account, a cognitive emotion). Schmid offers a shared subject account of collective guilt, in which he argues that individuals can regard themselves – along with others – as part of a group, together forming a single subject. It is when the individual regards herself as a group member that she feels grief. Although both accounts are promising, each is limited in certain respects: Gilbert’s account can only apply to structured groups, and she can only account for cognitive emotions that have no essential phenomenological component; Schmid’s account does not clearly show how it is that individuals come to identify with one another and form a single subject. Building on, and extending, their accounts, I will show how it is that individuals can come together to form a group – structured or not – and exert pressure on one another to align themselves with the group’s values, beliefs, goals, and ultimately, emotions. By coming in to alignment with one another, tacitly accepting certain group values, beliefs, and goals, a feeling of togetherness can arise such that a plural-subject can form. This plural-subject can have emotions, in that the individuals together feel the emotion. My account will improve upon Gilbert’s account of collective guilt, for it will accommodate emotions that are not purely cognitive, and apply to groups that are not formally structured. It will extend Schmid’s account, by making it clear exactly how individuals come together, rather than simply recognising a social group identity as their own.

## Empathic Knowledge and Emotional Identification with Fictional Characters

*Lisa Katharin Schmalzried, Universitat Luzern, Switzerland*

Aesthetic cognitivism claims that fictional works of art can be sources of knowledge about the real world (epistemic claim), and that this is aesthetically relevant (aesthetic claim). Concentrating on the epistemic claim, this paper argues that fictional works of art can be sources of empathic knowledge. This is the knowledge how it is emotionally like to be in a certain situation for someone else.

If a person has experienced a situation and can remember it, she knows how it is emotionally like to be in this situation. For empathic knowledge, this is not enough because a third-person-perspective comes into play. A successful emotional identification with another person can lead to empathic knowledge. One has to imagine experiencing a situation as the other person would experience it. One has to imagine experiencing this situation from within and sharing those properties with the other person that influence her emotional reaction. If the emotional identification is successful, one actually feels the way the other person would feel. If a person describes how she has experienced a situation, this description facilitates an emotional identification. Fictional works of art can fulfill the same function. Following Walton, as props in games of make-believe, they prescribe which propositions their audience should imagine being true. Furthermore, many works of art invite their audience to identify with some of their fictional characters. Insights to the characters’ (emotional) inner life make such an emotional identification easier. Additionally, certain artistic means help to trigger emotional reactions. Therefore, fictional works of art can be sources of empathic knowledge by guiding emotional identification with their fictional characters.

One might object that empathic knowledge should depend on real and reasonable emotions. But emotional identification with fictional characters often evokes emotions whose objects are fictional, and such emotions are unreal or unreasonable. The paradox of fiction underlies this objection. A broad cognitive theory of emotion can solve the paradox. Although emotions are partly cognitive, the cognition can be a mere thought. Therefore, emotions whose objects are fictional can be real and reasonable. Secondly, aesthetic cognitivism focuses on knowledge about the real world. By emotionally identifying with fictional characters, one can only learn how it is emotionally like to be in fictional situations for fictional characters. But the empathic knowledge gained from fictional works of art is transferable to the real world if fictional characters and situations sufficiently resemble real persons and situations. Thirdly, if fictional works of art are the source of empathic knowledge, they should guarantee that real person emotionally react as described. If somebody truthfully describes her actual experiences, this gives such a guarantee. In the case of fiction, however, the emotional reactions of fictional characters are (or can be) products of the author`s imagination. Nevertheless, work-internal signs of reliableness exist: The emotional reactions should be psychologically comprehensible depending on the descriptions of the situations and characters. If so, fictional works of art can be sources of empathic knowledge, and the epistemic claim of aesthetic cognitivism can be defended in this respect.

# G2 Emotions in the History of Philosophy

## Affects and Conscience in Spinoza

*Vasiliki Grigoropoulou, University of Athens, Greece*

I propose to explore the relationship between conscience and affects as outlined in the fourth Part of Spinoza’s Ethics and to argue that conscience is attended by the development of affects. Conscience is therefore not in the position to assume the role of the judge who might censure a person for his deeds or thoughts as in Christian ethics, because for Spinoza conscience is determined by the affects. ‘The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it’ (Ethics, IV, 8). In other words good and bad are defined in terms of affects, which are attended by conscience.

Ι. Τhe question of the development of conscience. Moral consciousness is another way of saying conscious affect. But the consciousness that accompanies the affects varies in accordance with the idea that we have firstly of our own power and secondly of the influences to which we are subject in the context of the relations by which we are determined. The self-consciousness is therefore at the basis of moral conscience. Spinoza’s Ethics culminates in a three-dimensional consciousness of self, of God and of things. As I propose to argue, the development of conscience is not to be explained only in terms of the development of ideas, but also – and above all – in terms of emotional life. Evaluations of good and bad depend on the degree of development of the affects.

ΙΙ. Spinoza quotes the famous line of Euripides’ Medea, ‘I see and approve the better, but I follow the worse’, which epitomizes the problem of lack of self-mastery. For Spinoza ‘No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect’ (IV, 14). If, for example, a person is addicted to tobacco, despite the fact that he knows tobacco is harmful, the knowledge does not inhibit the passion. The imperatives of practical reason cannot be effectual. Given that for Spinoza conscience is an affect of which we are conscious, it is contingent on our affects and on our lived experience. We may therefore, because we desire it, regard as good something does us harm. Intemperance, lack of self-restraint, does not appear to be responsive to discipline through the exercise of reason.

ΙΙΙ. The beginnings of a solution to the problem outlined above may be found, it seems, through the desire that derives from joy, that is to say from the sense of increasing power (IV, 18). In so far as affects of sadness give way to affects of joy, desires will emerge that differ from those generated by affects of sadness, corresponding to changes in consciousness also. The ability to transform passions into active affects derives from the human endeavor to persist in his being and to optimize his power, intellectual, physical and practical.

To summarize, I propose to argue that moral conscience as conscious affect is not a judge that may incriminate a person. In Spinoza’s programme affects are not subordinated to reason. What is provided is the framework within which affects may be brought to perfection. But Spinoza’s perfectionism, as propounded in his theory of the affects, is conjoined to the normativity that should govern social relations, given that human beings are a part of nature and so of necessity subject to its rules and laws.

## Ontology of Affects in Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze

*Kerstin Andermann, Leuphana Universitat Lόneburg, Germany*

My work is dedicated to the theory of affects in Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze. These three authors are in a very close relationship and are characterized equally by an anticartesanian, i.e. relational or horizontal understanding of ontology, which they identify as significant for their concept of the affects. In his major work *Ethica* (1677), Spinoza begins with the determination of the elementary structures of the world, whose basic principle is God as an infinite substance with infinite modes and attributes. By equating God and nature and the horizontal arrangement of the spheres of being, he founded a de-transzendental relation and avoids any apriori hierarchy. Based on the ontology, Spinoza develops his theory of affects as a prominent part of his *Ethics.* Substituting the starting point of his thought not in God, but in humans, it shows up as a theory of the conditions of a good life, i.e. as a theory of the human being, independently from nature, who can evolve and shape his life in a sovereign way. A central point to this is Spinoza’s theory of affects, not perceived as a disturbance which is to be overcome, but as connections that affiliate the body with external suggestions, that increase or decrease his agency and his capacity to act. For Spinoza affects are „affections of the Body by which the Body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.” Bodies are different modes of substance of God and that is nature. These modes can get very different shapes by different affections. Spinoza emphasizes the variability of beings through affections and the crucial point is to show the plural interdependency effects which is the body subordinated to and which affect the subject. There are no transcendent or transcendental conditions that constitute the subject, but the being of substance is its respective expression in various modes and attributes.

This defounding and deregulating trait in Spinoza becomes clear only after Nietzsche. It is contrary to the interpretations of a determinative, structured top down ontology, and shows the freedom of the subject as a possibility in the practical sense of therapeutics, i.e. as a development of affective capability and an increase of agency. The ontological foundation of the body in horizontal relations aims to show the plural affections which concern the subject in various ways. In this way, a radical variability of beings is stressed, which can become a very different shape by affections. The subject emerges from this interplay of affections and by this way it can take over quite different meanings, depending on which force takes possession of him. With this conception of plurality a range of possibilities of personality is indicated, which is not compatible with a determinative concept of essence of the subject. The “spinozist inspiration” (Deleuze) of Nietzsche refers mainly to the ontological and affect conception of a human being which is free and capable of acting. Nietzsche claims this in the late context of his conception of will, affect and forces. For Nietzsche, life is a constellation of differential, plural forces of affection whose activity is the practical principle of all living things. Based on this conception also Deleuze shows, that the body isn’t of essential reality, but of quite different meanings and receives his reality from these forces he is most affiliated to. Coming from Spinoza and carried out in Nietzsche, the desubstantialisation of leading terms, like genus, body, essence or nature shows the potential of criticism which is orientated by Spinozas ontological way of thinking and by his conception of the affects.

## Affect. Body. Desire. Emotionality in the Philosophical Concepts of Foucault and Butler

*Marita Rainsborough, Universitat of Hamburg, Germany*

Physicalness and bodily experiences occupy a central position in the philosophical concepts of Foucault and Butler. Both offer an anti – substantialist philosophical concept of the body. Emotionality, affectivity and the desire are related to the body. For Foucault their formation and regulation are part of the process of the constitution of the subject through discursive formations and dispositive power and also of the self-formation through the technologies of the self, such as meditative practices and nutritional concepts. Also mental concepts influence the creation of emotions and perceptions in this process. In this context Butler points out the aspect of vulnerability of human beings related to their physical and psychological conditions. Visibility, the so-called framing, produces both emotions and ethical attitudes. In this process a performative shift is possible, which also includes options for personal change and the change of society. Both authors accentuate the freedom to self-design in order to make social change possible.

For both philosophers emotions, affects and desire have to be considered as socially constructed. Thus they situate physicalness, perception, emotion and desire in a social/political dimension. Foucault concentrates especially on desire and affects as for example anger. For Butler affects, desire, perception and emotions altogether are of crucial importance. Butler focuses on the aspect of ethics as the basis of the consideration of socio-political processes, while Foucault aestheticizes the ethical lifestyle. Ethics in Foucault adopts the form of aesthetics. The ethical/aesthetic lifestyle is combined with a critical ethos of the ad hoc transformation of the social/historical situation. Butler favors to influence the control of the perception of the foreign and own suffering as an ethical/political task. Foucault and Butler provide us with complementary conceptions of the body, desire, affect and emotion and their importance for he self and the other in individual and social processes. They both point out a connection of emotional theory and social responsibility.

# G3 Individual Papers

## The Causal Structure of Emotion Experience

*Michele Davide Ombrato, Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, Switzerland*

Arguably, an attractive theory of the emotions must yield an analysis of the ‘causal structure’ of emotion experience specifying not only its eliciting cause but also its ‘sustaining cause’, i.e. what allows the experience to last the way it does. Such an analysis has yet to be provided. Relatedly, the whole issue of emotion individuation across time – i.e. when do two ‘chunks’ of experience qualify as part of the same emotion experience – is rather neglected. In this paper, I want to explore these issues. My proposal shall be that emotions, which I understand as felt episodic affective reactions with a distinctive intentional structure, constitutively involve attention and that attention is the sustaining cause of emotion experience. I shall contrast this view with a widespread approach according to which emotions are particular kinds of processes in which disparate components hang together (Goldie, 2012; Lambie & Marcel, 2002). The main advantage of the alternative view I put forwards is, I shall argue, that it allows us to clearly determine both the onset and the offset of emotion experiences. This in turn puts us in a position to introduce neat distinctions between emotion experiences and other related affective experiences – e.g., mood and arousal – as well as to provide an appealing account of the continuous transitions among emotions, moods and ‘residual’ arousal that we often experience.

## Feeling and Function: Conscious vs. Unconscious Emotions

*Katherine Tullmann, CUNY Graduate Center, United States*

This paper examines the role that consciousness plays in our emotional feelings and behaviors. Is it in virtue of emotions’ being conscious that they play such an important role in our mental and social lives? Or can unconscious emotions have largely the same behavioral results? I will argue against the view that the functionality of an emotion arises from the state’s being conscious, and so that it’s possible that unconscious emotions have significant functionality. I begin by discussing the possible relationship between an emotion’s having distinctive functions and its being conscious. An issue that arises here is that, on some views, emotions just are conscious feelings. According to some theories of emotions, such as those proposed by William James and his contemporary followers, emotions are necessarily conscious, or felt. If this view is correct, then emotions must be conscious in order for them to have any functional role in our behavior. This view makes some intuitive sense. From a first person perspective, it may feel like I act “emotionally” only when I am aware of my emotional feelings and, possibly, of the object of my emotion. I raise some initial doubts for this view based on work on emotional priming and unconscious emotional states, both of which suggest that emotions need not be conscious in order to affect our behavior. I then present a case against the (conscious) feeling theory, specifically in terms of the popular global workspace theory of consciousness. Many theorists who are influenced by the global workspace theories posited by Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene—as well as Ned Block’s similar notion of access consciousness—equate an emotion’s being conscious with its availability for executive control, from which the state’s functionality arises. I argue that this view conflates several important points. First, the term ‘feeling’ is ambiguous in the literature on emotions and consciousness. ‘Feeling’ can either refer to a type of mental state that may or may not be conscious or to a consciousness-attributing property. To assume that feelings are necessarily conscious is to ignore the possibility of unconscious feelings, such as hunger or pain. Second, the feeling theory assumes that all emotions are conscious and that an emotion’s functionality arises in virtue of its being conscious. However, this assumption is question-begging. Once we recognize that a feeling might be a non-necessary, consciousness-attributing property, we should also recognize that the functionality of a mental state might arise from some other property. Finally, I explore the implications of my arguments for general theories of consciousness. While my critique singles out the global-workspace theory and access consciousness, I think that my arguments apply to any theory that implies a unique, robust functional role for conscious emotions and other states. I further suggest that some theories of consciousness—namely, higher-order thought or perception theories—may more readily accommodate my arguments.

## Emotional Perception as Perception of Values.

*Sarah Songhorian, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Italy*

*Francesca Forlè, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Italy*

In contemporary debate there are several different theories of emotions. There are feeling theories (James 1884), conative theories (Frijda 1988) and cognitive ones. Within the latter kind both conceptualist perspectives (Solomon 1976) and non-conceptualist ones (Deonna, Teroni 2012) can be found. Our aim in this paper is that of trying to propose the idea that emotions can be described as perceptions of values.

In order to do so, we will start giving the schelerian account of a particular kind of emotion, that is vicarious emotions (Scheler 1923). This example will prove particularly relevant because vicarious emotions are one of the clearest cases in which we can identify the object as valuable, specifically because they involve other people – commonly considered as valuable – and their affective states. The same account that will be provided here can also be applied to the other emotional experiences.

We will focus therefore on the careful analysis of fellow-feelings conducted by Scheler. We will propose a three variables model that will help us explain the elements of vicarious emotions, focusing, in particularly, on the object of those phenomena. We will also provide an account of the difference between the nature of those phenomena and the level of consciousness that the subject of them can experience in any given case. In particular, we will see that fellow-feelings in general have as their object valuable features, either another person or a specific affective state of that person. The level of consciousness of the subject sharing the emotion is not at issue here, since it does not change the nature of the experience itself or its objective source.

Having shown that the object of fellow-feelings in general are value-qualities, we will investigate which specific act is able to present them in propria persona (Husserl 1901, 1913). We will show that we can describe this act as a perception, in particular affective perception. So, if fellow-feelings have value-qualities as their objects, and if value-qualities are presented in propria persona in the act of affective perception, then we can describe fellow-feelings as a particular kind of value perception.

Fellow-feelings, a specific kind of emotion, can then be considered in parallel with other forms of perceptions, so that our account can be described as a partially non-conceptualist view on emotions as acts of presentation of value-qualities.

# H1 Theories of Emotion

## Towards a Phenomenological Correspondence Theory of Emotions

*Timothy Mosteller, California Baptist University, United States*

The notion of correspondence between mind and world is often applied to the concept of truth. This paper will consider the notion of correspondence applied to emotions. It is possible to see that our emotions sometimes correspond and sometimes do not correspond to the things which they are about. For example, one might experience an extreme emotion of raging anger over some small matter such as being cut off on the highway by another motorist. It is possible to recognize that such an extreme emotional “over-reaction” to a minor offense was inappropriate. It did not correspond to the circumstances of that event.

This paper explores how a careful, reflective phenomenological awareness of particular emotional events can help us to understand the nature of emotions and how they correspond or fail to correspond to things in the world.

First, actual cases of both congruous and incongruous emotional experiences will be considered. I will argue that such experiences do occur and that such occurrences are natural and not socially constrained.

Second, the nature of the relata in the relation will be analyzed. I will argue that paying attention to the “what it is like” to have an emotional reaction correspond to (or fail to correspond to) a perceived event presents us with three things. 1) We are presented with an awareness of the properties of the emotion as it appears within our mental life. 2) We are presented with the awareness of the properties in the world to which the emotion corresponds or fail to correspond. 3) We are presented with the awareness of the actual relation of correspondence or lack of correspondence between the experience of the emotion and the experience of the world.

Third, I will consider what further knowledge can be inferred from this awareness. I argue that this phenomenal awareness implies that emotions do not correspond to mere formal objects which exist only in perceptive acts. I argue our phenomenal awareness implies that real correlative properties exist in objects apart from formal objects to which emotional responses can correspond or fail to correspond.

Fourth, I argue that the awareness of emotional correspondence (or lack thereof) entails a specific normativity of emotions. I argue that a phenomenal awareness of emotions can teach us how emotions appropriately ought to correspond to events external to us.

## Social Emotions between Normativity and Naturalism

*Rebekka Hufendiek, University of Basel, Switzerland*

In recent years philosophical discussion of emotions has brought forward several accounts that are both naturalist and noncognitivist (see e.g. Prinz 2004, Griffiths; Scarantino 2009, Hutto 2012). These approaches tend to highlight that emotions should not be seen as complex cognitive evaluations but rather as patterned reactions that are emobodied, have their roots in evolution and directly motivate for the interaction with the environment. In my talk I will argue that there are indeed good reasons to highlight the noncognitive dimension of emotions as well as their embodiment and their roots in evolution. I also agree with the general critique of cognitivist theories that the description of emotions as complex cognitive evaluations is an overintellectualization of the phenomenon (see e.g. Goldie 2000). Yet I will argue that current theories underestimate a further main claim that traditional cognitivist accounts brought forward, namely that emotions do have a certain kind of normative content: Fear does not simply mirror a certain state of affairs in the world, fear seems to be about something that is dangerous for us, i.e. something that is not good and therefore should be avoided. Fear involves an evaluation of a situation with regard to one’s well-being. Things become even more complex when taking the so-called self-conscious emotions into view: Guilt appears to be about the violation of a social rule committed by oneself while moral anger seems to be about a violation of a social rule committed by somebody else. It has frequently been argued that these emotions presuppose an explicit understanding of social rules and norms. But most contemporary noncognitivist, naturalist approaches ascribe only some kind of basic intentionality or nonconceptual content to emotions without developing in detail how such basic intentional states could be evaluative or even entail an explicit understanding of social rules and norms. Particularly the latter is something that involves conceptual knowledge yet noncognitivists wanted to explain the emotions intentionality without referring to conceptual content. To give an adequate explaination of the normative content of emotions without overintellectualizing the phenomenon is therefore what I call the hard problem of emotion theory. I will suggest a solution for the hard problem by presenting a noncognitive naturalist approach that takes emotions to be a kind of nonconceptual social knowing how that is deeply embodied and situated into a particular environment. Emotional content, I argue, has to be externalized: It should be understood as reoccuring scenarios in the biological and social environments of living beings that are of central importance for their well being. Such an understanding of emotional content implies a certain kind of normative realism: what becomes represented in emotions are relational properties that exist independently of an observer perceiving them. The integration of normative realism into a naturalist ontology allows us to think of emotions as a kind of embodied, skillful knowledge that directly responds to things that matter in the world. The complexity of what emotions are about is thereby seen as a result of the interaction between brain, body and world rather than an internal cognitive process.

## Emotions, Motivations, and Evaluative Reasons

*Samuel Lepine, University de Lyon, France*

A widely held view assumes that emotions are perceptions or representations of values (De Sousa, 1987; Prinz, 2004; Döring, 2007). For instance, to fear a dog is to perceive a danger, to be sad when Sally dies is to perceive a loss, and so on. Among the many virtues of this thesis, one is that as well as perceptions can be correct or not, emotions can be appropriate or not, so that there are “correctness conditions” for our emotions. An emotion is appropriate if its representational content refers to a value existing objectively. This is a tempting view, but it faces also serious problems which, taken seriously, should lead us to quite a different account.

First, whereas the correctness conditions of a perception are mostly independent of the subject, it seems that those of an emotion depend at least partly on what someone cares about. If I care about my daughter, I should be afraid when she is sick, happy when she succeeds in a contest, and so on (Helm, 2001). To say it otherwise, it seems that an emotion is appropriate not only when it is justified in the light of the evaluative properties of a situation, but also when it fits with one’s emotional motivations, like desires, concerns, and sentiments. A second problem is directly linked to this first one: if an emotion responds not only to a situation, but to our motivations, how should we conceive those motivations? One possibility, which has not been much tackled so far, is that our motivations count as reasons to feel emotions. That is, our motivations not only explain the occurrence of an emotion, but they justify it: John feels anxiety because he really wants to get this job. Unlike perceptions, then, emotions are linked to reasons which may be subjective or objective. And thence, their evaluative content is constituted by normative considerations, notably our individual as well as social values (Salmela, 2011). Finally, the emotional experience of a value may sometimes happen to be blurred, as it is often the case with mixed feelings. I suggest that, in this particular case, emotions do not give us reasons – as it is assumed in the perceptual model – but that they foster the search of evaluative reasons regarding what we really care about and what we should feel.

During my talk I will first examine those difficulties, and then I will argue that, if we want to handle them, we must give up on the perceptual theory. Emotions are not perceptions, but attitudes that we adopt towards things about which we care. According to this view, an emotion is appropriate when it fits the objective situation and is consistent with our motivations. I will suggest that this allows us to understand how our motivations can partly justify our emotions, and how emotions can entertain the search of evaluative reasons. Finally, I will review some empirical evidence which support this view.

# H2 Emotions & Morality 2

## Emotions and Welfare

*Wojciech Zaluski, Jagiellonian University, Poland*

In the philosophical literature devoted to welfare relatively little attention has been paid to emotions: none of the three dominant theories of welfare (hedonic theory, desire theory, eudaimonic theory) puts special, or even any, stress on emotions as a factor relevant for generating welfare. It is argued in the paper that this neglect of emotions is unjustified. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part relations between emotions and welfare are analyzed. It is argued that these relations are strongly ambivalent. Some emotions (e.g., love) are an important source of welfare (understood, grosso modo, as hedonic happiness) and some others (e.g., envy) are an obstacle for experiencing welfare. But, as was noticed long time ago by the Stoic sages, those emotions which are a source of welfare become easily transformed into emotions which reduce welfare (e.g., grief, hatred, disappointment). Thus, it can be plausibly argued that emotions, when left in their ‘natural state’(i.e., a state that was ‘given’ to us by the mechanisms of biological evolution), which is a disordered one, constitute in the first place a serious, or even fundamental, obstacle for experiencing welfare. This conclusion – that emotions need to be subject to ‘therapy’ if they are to bring about a ‘positive balance’ of welfare – was reached independently by many ancient thinkers: not only the Stoic ones, but also the Epicurean, the Platonic, or the Buddhist. The question arises what kind of ‘therapy of emotions’ is most efficient in generating welfare. This problem is analyzed in the second part of the paper. The part is focused on the arguably best developed therapy of emotions, viz. one proposed by the Stoics. It is argued in the paper that this therapy can be interpreted in two different ways. On the first, traditional, interpretation (supported, e.g., by Seneca’s Epistulae morales ad Lucillum), one should reach the state of apatheia, i.e., suppress all basic emotions (pleasure, desire, fear, grief), and thereby also all the compound ones. On the second interpretation (supported, e.g., by Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes), one should suppress only one of the four basic emotions (viz. grief) and transform the remaining ones into their ‘reasonable’ counterparts, viz. pleasure into joy, desire into volition and fear into caution. It is argued in the paper that the Stoic therapy is more attractive on its second interpretation but still not devoid of defects. In general, one can say that, given the significance of emotions for the question of welfare, finding a proper ‘therapy of emotions’ still constitutes an important challenge for all those concerned with this question.

## Emotional economies. The entanglements of desire and economy in the era of neoliberalism

*Jule Jakob Govrin, Freie Universitat Berlin, Germany*

In this lecture I seek to discuss the topos of desire on two different levels: on a methodological level I reflect on the status of desire in the field of theories of emotions and affect studies; on a diagnostic level I contemplate on the contemporary socio-political condition in Europe. Hence, my project is located at the interface of social and political philosophy.

My hypothesis is that desire and economy are intrinsically entangled. Since Plato and Aristotle, desire has been grasped in terms of regulation: the subject has to regulate his/her passions in order to live healthily and to act ethical. Hence, desire operates according to an economic principle. Yet, these entanglements of desire and economy go beyond a merely systemic dimension, because economy, one could argue, is always driven by desires while it simultaneously creates desire. For instance, oikos as the model of household contained a socioeconomic institution, which implied the regulation of desires (cif. Foucault 1984). The most prominent model of desire, guiding from Plato to psychoanalysis, defines desire as an unfillfillable wish. But the libidinal economy of lack is being juxtaposed by the poststructuralist idea of desire as productivity (Deleuze/Guattari 1972; cif. Schaub 2004; Butler 1987). Taking the postulate of an intrinsic connection of desire and economy as a springboard, I pose the question: how to rethink desire in the era of neoliberalism? The hypothesis to pursue is that the two models of desire, desire as lack and desire as productivity, currently coexist and interfere.

Following the idea that affective and intimate relationships constitutively changed and that the disposition of sexuality is an important area for socioeconomic negotiations (cif. Herzog 2011; Engel 2009), I aim to reconceptualise desire in the light of neoliberalism. The sociologist Eva Illouz states that the commodification of love and sexuality still deploys at the sight of romantic love (cif. Illouz 1997; 2007). While the erotic is being integrated in the sphere of consumption, practices of dating are embedded in a market logic of matchmaking. Yet, while sexuality and love become more and more differentiated, the ideal of romantic love is still efficacious as it defines the romantic social imaginary. Caught in this paradox of romantic disillusion and illusion, the postmodern subject cultivates erotic entrepreneurship as form of self-governmentality. Rationalizing his/her desires, consuming bodies and making the own body consumable, negotiating desires in terms of reasonable decisions, turning affects into communicable emotions, these self-technological operations depict the commodification of erotic and intimacy. I allege two literary examples by Michel Houellebecq (1994/2002) and Jonathan Franzen (2010/2011) in order to demonstrate this development.

My key questions are: How to capture the intermingling of desire and love? Should desire be defined as an emotion or rather as a bundling of affects? In the sight of the socio-political presence further questions are: what is the ethical relation of the desiring subject to the Other? How do new emerging forms of affection and intimacy like e.g. patchwork families and open relationships match into neoliberal market logics? With this critical endeavour I seek to contribute to philosophical studies of emotions by introducing desire as a central analytical category.

## Moral Emotions Development

*Jose Tovar, Universidad de San Buenaventura, Colombia*

The aim of this paper is to account for the moral emotions development. First, the role that sympathy plays on this emotions development is explained. Second, basic emotions definition is presented specially to elucidate its representational content. Third, basic emotions are recalibrated to constitute non-basic emotions is showed to introduce moral emotions, which are a kind of non-basic emotions. On that subject, I maintain that the boundary between basic and non-basic emotions is fuzzy. Finally, moral norm’s importance to moral emotions activation is formulated.

# H3 Symposium on Romantic Love 2

## Bestowal, Appraisal, and Attachment

*Edward Harcourt, Keeble College, Oxford, UK*

Focusing on Bennett Helm’s bookLove, Friendship and the Self, I address the rivalry between appraisal and bestowal accounts of love.Helm sets out to provide an account that remedies the defects of both appraisal and bestowal accounts. First I want to raise some questions about Helm’s solution to the bestowal/appraisal dilemma. Then I want to question the motivation for the solution, by arguing that there is something about the bestowal account that needs to be held on to, viz. the idea that in some sense our loves are prior to any reasons we might be able give for them.

Compare thirst - people do not experience thirst for reasons, it is just something we are subject to because of the way we are, independently of our rational natures. But the fact that we are rational creatures subject - independently of reason - to thirst gives rise to a great many other kinds of reason, for example people develop tastes for this or that drink which are then reasons for them to drink one thing rather than another; drinking now rather than later (or later rather than now) is a kind of reason; the intersection of drinking with health is another kind, etcetc. These are all reasons for doing things which satisfy thirst, or which connect with thirst in some way, but none reaches as far as to be a reason \*for\* thirst itself.

I think something like this is true of love too. We are rational creatures equipped with a number of non-rational dispositions. One of these is the disposition to form attachments to particular persons. The fact that we are equipped with it makes it more likely that we will survive to reproductive age, because its expression (especially in infancy) engages certain dispositions of those particular others, which in turn favour survival. So the right place to look for explanations of this disposition is evolutionary theory – not agents’ reasons. (Also, they are equally manifest in adults, infants and (with variations) in non-human mammals, at least the last of which do not appear to do anything for reasons.) It is as much of a mistake to ask for reasons for people’s forming attachments as it is to ask for reasons for people’s being thirsty.

My thought is that human love is either identical to, or involves, the human attachment disposition. This can be shown by the near-perfect match between various intuitive ‘marks’ of love, and attachment behaviour. (It would in fact be better to say love involves or is identical to a complex of such nonrational dispositions – attachment theorists also speak of the caregiving system in parents, which the attachment system enlists. If there is such a thing, it is presumably involved in love too, but the same considerations apply to it as to attachment.) If that is correct, it would explain what’s right about the ‘bestowal’ account, i.e. why reasons come into love in all sorts of ways, but also why they never reach as far as a pure appraisal account implies: it would be as pointless to ask for reasons for loving as it is to ask for reasons for being thirsty. (It might also help explain why, in love, others are valued ‘for their own sakes’, though I am less sure about that.)

## Socrates, the Romantic Lover?

*Tomas Hejduk, University of Pardubice, Department of Philosophy, Czech Republic*

The theoreticians of love say that the concept of romantic love appears in rudimentary undeveloped form already in Plato (e.g. R. Solomon, About Love, p. 24). It seems that Socrates as the main character of Plato’s dialogues about love introduces into Ancient Greek culture and so also into European society some elements of the phenomenon which is called romantic love in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. And it seems that this contribution of Socrates’ can be maintained even though it is impossible to include Socrates’ erotic conception in the contemporary concept of romantic love. Socrates can be associated with the latter only as a “Pilgrim Father” opening the way to this sort of love by inventing some figures of it or creating principles on which the concept of romantic love could be built.

The presentation analyses Socrates’ concept of love as it was described in Plato’s dialogues. Nevertheless, the main question is whether it is possible to speak about preromantic love in the case of Socrates’ love. We ask what elements or figures of Socrates’ erotic can be counted as romantic or preromantic and what figures are anti-romantic. We will examine both figures, the romantic and the anti-romantic, in full order to say in what sense it is a romantic or anti-romantic figure.

To make the study more subtle we compare two Ancient Greek concepts of love: the traditional one (Theognis and conventional paiderastia) and the philosophical one (Socrates’). The proposed discordance between them and its demonstration should unveil Socrates’ approach to love in full light. We suppose that in dealing with E(e)ros Socrates unsettles, criticizes and trespasses the simple traditional rules (Theognis) and opens a new horizon. Compared to the traditional patterns of behaviour and thinking, (Socrates’) philosophy represents an erotically non-economic, strongly generalized, romantic reciprocity.

## Jealousy and Self-Respect

*Rachel Fredericks, Colby-Sawyer College, United States*

Jealousy is a complicated emotion, and there is substantial disagreement about whether and when it is morally good, bad, or neutral. Part of the disagreement may stem from the fact that while jealousy is intimately connected to the self-conceptions of the subjects who experience it, the exact nature of that connection remains rather opaque. So, if one wants to defend the claim that jealousy is in some sense morally valuable (as some do), then one might begin by trying to specify the relation between jealousy and a positive self-conception.

According to what I call the self-respect proposal, jealous subjects can be worthy of moral praise because and insofar as their jealousy can help maintain or enhance their self-respect. This proposal can be supported in various ways: by arguing that (a) jealousy is a way to defend relationships (including those that ground one’s self-respect) in the face of threats from rivals; (b) jealousy makes it possible (or simply easier) to value oneself; (c) jealousy acknowledges or validates one’s beliefs, desires, projects, values, and/or commitments; (d) jealousy is partially constitutive of self-respect; or (e) jealousy is a form of protest against one’s being treated in a way that one perceives as unwarranted, and thus a sign that one already respects oneself.

In this paper, I critically assess each of these attempts to defend the self-respect proposal, and I conclude that we lack sufficient reason to believe that feeling jealous can render a person morally praiseworthy through the maintenance or enhancement of that person’s self-respect.

In doing so, I bring to light some interesting facts about jealousy that existing literature on this emotion has left in the dark. For instance, while some people claim that jealousy is morally valuable because and insofar as it helps people defend their morally valuable relationships from rivals, this claim obscures the fact that the non-jealous party in the relationship is an agent who is more or less autonomous. Speaking of interpersonal relationships as objects that require defense is problematic, because people are in such relationships only insofar as they are engage with other persons, and those other persons do and should have a say in the nature and duration of said relationships. Insofar as others can and do autonomously choose to change or end their relationships with us, we should recognize those autonomous decisions for what they are and respond appropriately. Jealousy, for reasons that I discuss, drives a wedge between the parties to relationships. This is antithetical to fostering the cooperation and acceptance between those parties that is required for (a) one party to respond in a morally appropriate way to the autonomous decisions of the other party and (b) for the parties to preserve what makes their relationship morally valuable in the first place.

# I1 Philosophy and Emotion Science 2

## The Modern Search for the Holy Grail: Philosophy of Neuroscience and the Case of Happiness

*Navot Naor, University of Haifa, Israel*

*Hadas Okon-Singer, University of Haifa, Israel*

Rooted in enlightenment, the modern pursuit of happiness has proved, time and again, to be a treacherous journey, in part due to happiness` indefinability. Nevertheless, one must wonder, does the classical quest for term definition still bear weight in our contemporary scientific world, and if it does, can neuroscience help in defining what was once indefinable? Moreover, the involvement of neuroscience relates to yet another fundamental question, namely, what the correct use of ever improving imaging techniques in the attempt to answer questions of this sort is. In this article, we will use the research of happiness as an example when discussing these questions. We will review the work done on Hedonia, Eudaimonia, positivity bias and depression, in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, psychotherapy, and philosophy. Discussing such fundamental questions, in the context of happiness, as well as other difficult-to-define concepts, may help in the shaping of contemporary neuroscience

## Mirroring, Mindreading and the Content of Emotions

*Constanza Zoé Sánchez Barbieri, Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Argentina*

Both in philosophy of mind and psychology, the ability to understand other people's mental states has been extensively studied. Goldman (2009) distinguishes two types of mindreading, “low-level” and “high-level”. Low-level mindreading is based on "mirroring" processes and is the mechanism used to attribute emotions, intentions in action and sensations to others. “Mirroring" is defined as a process whereby a system of mirror-neurons is activated in both the person undergoing a type of mental state (endogenously) and in the other perceiving or observing its sign. Low-level (and mirror-based) mindreading is subpersonal, simpler and more primitive than high-level mindreading. In contrast, high-level mindreading involves cognitive resources such as imagination, projection and perspective-taking, apparently without involving mirroring processes. I will focus here on the connection that, according to Goldman, could exist between mirroring processes and the attribution of emotional states (Adolph et al., 2002; Iacoboni et al. 2001; Goldman & Sripada, 2005), and will consider the “unmediated resonance model” or “mirroring model”, proposed by Goldman to account for emotional reading, involving: [1] Observation of the target’s expression of a mental state, [2] An emotion that matches the target’s mental state (through mirroring), [3] Classification of that emotion, [4] Attribution of emotion to the target.

Visscher Hole IV (2010) has claimed, in opposition to Goldman, that mirror-neurons do not support simulation-based, low-level mindreading as the mirroring model does not suggest there is any distinctively simulational about mindreading. Furthermore, he argues that to adequately interpret a mental state and attribute it to others, the interpreter should capture the content of that mental state. Yet the mere activity of mirror-neurons does not seem to provide the interpreter with the content of the mental state but just with the mirrored facial or bodily expression. According to Visscher Hole IV, in order to know the content of the mental state of the target, inference is required.

I contend a simulationist can overcome this last objection, in the event of attributions of emotions to others, when two conditions are met: i) in a situation of “intermediate triangulation” (Bar-On, 2011) between two agents (interpreter and target) and an object, when each agent adjusts their own reaction to the expressive behavior the other agent shows towards the object; and ii) if the contents of the emotional states of the interpreted subject are “cued” (Gärdendorf, 1996; 2005), i.e., these representational contents stand for something present or may be triggered in the current external situation of the representing organism. In the circumstances, when the interpreter sees someone else’s emotions, she observes their facial and bodily expressions as well as the object of the interpreted emotions (a sign) that are perceptually available in her environment. Thus, the interpreter can perceive both the relation between the target and the object, and the target’s emotional expression and progressive adjustments to the situation. To my mind, these are, at least in some cases, all the elements required for a successful simulationist, low-level and mirror-based attribution of emotional states to others.

## Act or Enact? The Subject is Representing Herself.

*Mercedes Rivero, Carlos III University, Spain*

My thesis is proposed to examine why the agent acts and interacts in specifics scenarios in a particular way. To do this, I will draw on the work of a long tradition of researchers who bet on the dramatization of the subject: The symbolic Interactionism. This theory postulated that actions and expressions are what enable the subject's interactions in such environments. The thesis that I defend, also based on David Velleman’s work, considers that the agent, as the theater actors, enacts herself before an audience that watch her expression and actions, and for that she needs to turn to the Epistemics Perspectives which I called three gazes: 1) First person perspective, which involves the subject's experience with the social role that she wants to performs; 2) Second person perspective, which offers her the chance to interact with the environment and other people; and 3) Third person perspective, which provides the audience's gaze that will condition the subject's actions. These gazes are the ground of social performance of any subject. They give both her and the people she interacts with in a given context a way to act in a coherent manner, in a enactivism sense: All this happens at the time in which she performs. Hence, the agent needs to use these three gazes in order to act in a particular context: the subject is dramatized by herself.

In this proposal, I will inquire about why the subject acts in certain social contexts in the way that she does. What happens when she needs to interact in specific scenarios with other agents? To give so, I will give a review of the most prominent theories of action –Donald Davidson, or Elizabeth Anscombe, among others –by showing how the theory of dramatic action which I propose is a logical consequence of prior theories. In addition, I will put the question: How can the subject acts when she is basing her action on first, second and third person perspectives, which I have called: the three gazes? In closing, I will outline this scheme of dramatic action –which encompasses the three gazes that the subject uses to interact with other persons –by means of an example in the person's everyday life.

One of the main goal is to demostrate that it should be reasonable to think that, on many occasions, it is very possible that the subject acts in this way without needing to resort to mental representations. The three gazes make this possible by offering the subject a manner to behave –in a coherent way for her and the persons with whom she interacts in a certain context –which is close to the enactivism. Therefore, it is likely that this process, which made up the action, does not require previous mental representations, because it originates at the same moment in which the subject wants to act.

# I2 Continental Philosophy of Emotion

## Brentano on Right Emotion

*Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, University of Szczecin, Poland*

Brentano accepted Hume’s view that the world around us contains no axiological or normative aspects that could make our value claim true as well as the claim that emotions are the only foundation of our valuations. Nonetheless he doesn’t agree with Hume’s sceptical conclusion. In spite of having no truth-makers there is a sense in which our emotions could be said to be objectively right and wrong. Brentano distinguishes three classes of mental phenomena: presentations, judgements and emotions. Presentations constitute the basic level. A presentation consists simply in being intentionally directed at an (immanent) object. Judgements and emotions are built on presentations and take their objects. The difference consists thus not in a new object, but in a new mental modus by means of which the object is apprehended. A judgement is a kind of mental “acceptance” or “rejection” and an emotion is a similar (but this time emotional) acceptance or rejection. To sum up: The subject is directed at an immanent object by the act of presentation. Judgements and emotions do not change objects but only apprehend them through some binary (theoretical or emotional) mental modi. Now what about the correctness of mental acts. Let us begin with judgments. The classical view says that a judgement is true exactly in case if it “corresponds” to the reality and this idea could be easily applied here. One could assume that a positive judgement is true if and only if its object exists and a negative one is true if it is not the case. But Brentano doesn’t adopt this solution. Instead he defines truth epistemically as a kind of idealised justifiability. The maximal grade of epistemic justification he calls evidence; and a true judgement is defined as a judgement that would be also judged by someone who judges with evidence. This epistemic interpretation of truth make it possible to dispense with the notion of satisfaction and that of truth-maker. The concept of correctness of a judgement is defined not by relation to some external reality but instead by relation to our epistemic procedures of justification. A similar technique can be applied to emotional phenomena. All we have to do is to introduce a correlative notion of emotional evidence or emotional justificatory procedures. This was indeed the way proposed by Brentano. The notion of a correct emotion is not to be defined by any relation to objective values. We have to proceed exactly the other way round: an object is valuable if and only if it is a possible target of a correct love; and as we have an emotional analogue of evidence applicable to our emotions, we can define a correct emotion as an emotion that could be had with an emotional evidence. What we get at the end of the day is a kind of anti-realist, conceptualist approach. The answer to the question what is right and wrong depends not on any objective structures in the external, mind independent world, but rather on the justifiability of our value claims.

## Bergson's Analysis of Emotions

*Yannis Prelorentzos, University of Ioannina, Greece*

## The Status of Emotions in Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Science

*Efstathios Veltsos, Panteion University, Greece*

In science, emotions are usually characterized as subjective and irrational therefore they may seem neglected by philosophers of science. Gaston Bachelard, known as philosopher of scientific materialism, appears to belong to the French philosophical tradition of notions and rationality, making a distinct separation from a philosophy of subject and experience. He is also known for his original work, considered to be a separate pole of his epistemological analysis, on philosophical theory of imagination and poetic image. The study of the formation of the scientific mind throughout education and scientific research in Bachelard’s “historical epistemology” reveals the interaction between emotions and other mind faculties (as imagination, intuition, intelligence) involved in the scientific process. Bachelard suggests that scientific knowledge, achieved by the conflict between images and notions, provokes emotions. Meanwhile, he suggests that emotions act in the scientific process. Emotions are obstacles which must be overcome. They are also stimulators that deserve to be preserved for heuristic purposes. To explore where and how emotions interfere within the processes of mind formation, I will focus on the description of the stages of knowledge which Bachelard undertakes in three books, while presenting ideas and subjects from other domains of philosophy and even psychology, psychoanalysis and literature, that he borrows and tests in his epistemology. This analysis is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the use of emotions in science and their specific status in Gaston Bachelard’s epistemology, by examining terms such as “intellectual happiness”, “joyful imagination”.

# I3 Emotive Expressions

## Emotive Performatives

*Renia Gasparatou, University of Patras, Greece*

Today many argue for the interconnection between emotion and cognition from many different perspectives. I suggest that a new version of Austin’s speech act theory can provide one more way to relate the two.

Even though Austin emphasises the performative function of language, he completely overlooks its emotive feature. I believe though, that one need to embrace the emotional component of our utterances in order to develop a performative account of language. Hence, we need a renewed version of speech act theory. A speech act theory that includes emotions could help us analyse the strong interconnection of emotion and cognition and account for the performative function of our utterances as well. I will (a) offer such a revised version of speech act theory and (b) use it to highlight the strong relation of emotion and cognition within our every utterance.

Austin wants to emphasise the performative role of language: when we say something about the world, we also do something in the world. More specifically, whenever we talk, we perform three kinds of speech acts. E.g. if one utters “shoot her” , they perform:

• A locutionary act or locution: the act of pronouncing sounds that make sense. I suggest this is the more cognitive act of communicating some kind of information.

• An illocutionary act or illocution: what I do in uttering this sentence in this context. E.g. “He urged (or advised, ordered…) me to shoot her”. I will suggest that a strong element within illocutions is emotion.

• A perlocutionary act or perlocution: what I do by uttering this sentence. E.g. “He got me to shoot her” and as further consequence I probably went to jail. Perlocutions have to do with the effects our illocutions have on the audience.

Austin points out again and again that the three acts are actually indistinguishable. In fact, we need to grasp “the total speech act in the total speech situation” in order to be fully aware of what has been said. However, illocution is the key in order to understand what one means in uttering a sentence in real time circumstances. According to Austin, illocutionary acts depend on the speaker’s authority, their intentions and the overall conventions implied by the context.

I suggest that illocutionary acts also depend heavily on the emotion(s) conveyed:

• Emotions both reveal and depend on the speaker’s intentions, desires and feelings, however conscious or not.

• The manifestation of emotions has to do with the community’s conventions; they are shaped by the context but they also shape the context of the utterance, thus influencing illocutions.

• Emotions constitute strategies and/or immediate evaluative reactions and underlie the politics of speech.

In fact, the performative function of language, which Austin promotes, strongly depends on the emotive element of illocutions. Emotion then is a key feature within illocutions and should be embraced in a new version of speech act theory.

Yet, if we connect emotions and illocutions, we put an emotional force within every speech act. All our utterances have an emotive force. And our emotive illocutions cannot be separated from the information we convey (our cognitive locutions) or the effects of this utterance on the audience (our political perlocutions). Austin’s speech act theory, slightly modified, is an elegant tool that can help show the interconnection between cognition and emotion within every utterance.

## The Meanings of Emotional Expressions

*Trip Glazer, Georgetown University, United States*

Emotional expressions provide observers with information. A smile informs an observer that someone is happy, a frown that someone is angry, and tears that someone is sad. We depend heavily upon our ability to recognize emotional expressions in others as we navigate a complex social world. As philosophers, our task is to understand the *meaningfulness* of emotional expressions: what kind of “content” they have, how they “encode” this meaning, and how observers are capable of “reading” them.

My aim in this paper is to assess the merits of three basic approaches to conceiving the meaningfulness of emotional expressions, which I dub the “semantic,” “pragmatic,” and “metasemantic” approaches. Each may be viewed as an attempt to answer the following question: how are *expressions* of emotions (verbal or nonverbal) distinct from *reports* of emotions? What is the difference, for example, between an utterance of “I am utterly crestfallen” (an expression) and “She is utterly crestfallen” (a report)? I shall present objections against the semantic and pragmatic approaches and argue that only the metasemantic approach provides a viable explanation of the meaningfulness of emotional expressions. Here, very briefly, are the three approaches:

1. The “semantic approach” claims that expressions differ from reports in having different kinds of *meanings*. Recall classic expressivist analyses of moral terms.1 Although the sentences “murder is wrong” and “murder is illegal” are grammatically similar, expressivists argue that they are “saying” different sorts of things altogether. The sentence “murder is illegal” expresses a *proposition*, which can be true or false, while the sentence “murder is wrong” expresses a *mental state* directly, which cannot. According to the semantic approach, reports have meanings determined by their *truth conditions*, while expressions have meanings determined by their *sincerity conditions*. These are two, unassimilable types of meanings.

2. The “pragmatic approach,” in turn, concedes that expressions and reports can have the same kind of meaning, but proposes that they differ in being produced by different kinds of *acts*. A report is the product of thoughtful introspection, whereas an expression is the product of a psychophysiological process that “presses an emotion out,” as it were.2 The pragmatic approach is often used to ground an epistemic difference between the two: expressions are more trustworthy than reports because the former are produced by a natural process that is hard to fake.

3. Finally, the “metasemantic approach” claims that expressions differ from reports by *encoding* their meanings in different kinds of ways. Very roughly: linguistic acts differ from non-linguistic acts by encoding information *propositionally*, whereas expressive acts differ from non-expressive acts by encoding information *perceptually*—that is, by enabling observers to *perceive* the emotional state expressed.3 Reports encode information propositionally but not perceptually, verbal expressions encode information both propositionally and perceptually, and nonverbal expressions encode information perceptually but not propositionally. Reports and expressions can have the same meaning, but they encode this meaning in different kinds of ways.

After presenting arguments against the semantic and pragmatic approaches, I shall conclude by suggesting how the metasemantic approach enables us to understand more clearly the myriad ways in which emotional expressions function in interpersonal communication. We can *do* a great many things with emotional expressions, above and beyond simply revealing our emotional states to others.

## Matching Emotions through Bodily Expressions – Some Lessons from Research in Autism

*Anna Ciaunica-Garrouty, University Of Lyon 2, France*

The relationship between embodying emotions, feeling emotional states and acquiring and using information about emotion is currently the subject of a substantial amount of research in psychology and neuroscience. One of the most robust cases of mimicry is mirroring of emotional facial expressions, which facilitates social interaction, emotional contagion and emotion recognition (Dimberg 1982; Lundguist & Dimberg 1995; Niedenthal et al. 2005). The fundamental social process of automatic mimicry seems impaired in disorders such as autism. Crucially, unlike motor stereotypies and repetitive behavior, the lack of social and emotional mirroring is unique to the disorder. For example, Stone et al (1997) found dissociation between (i) imitation of actions and objects and (ii) imitation of body/facial actions in Autistic Individuals (AI henceforth). This suggests that there is an intact cognitive understanding of means-end relationship in autism (Sigman & Ungerer 1984). It has been argued that imitation of instrumental or functional actions may reflect the more cognitive facets of imitation and may be less affected in autism. For example, McIntosh et al. (2006) compared automatic and voluntary mimicry of emotional facial expressions in AI and a matched comparison sample of typical individuals and found that AI did not automatically mimic facial expressions, but they were equally successful as typical participants on voluntary mimicry. This suggests that their absence of automatic mimicry was not due to deficits in perception, praxis, motivation or task understanding. In other words, AI use, in order to compensate, effortful cognitive strategies based on learned associations and prototypical references to label emotional expressions. Hence, imitation performance on complex goal-oriented tasks tells us little about automatic processes that might contribute to rapid sharing of affective states. Indeed, for many emotion tasks, ASD individuals, given sufficient time, might be able to use non-affective compensatory strategies to accomplish the task. Building upon the distinction between *online* and *offline* cognition as developed within the embodied cognition research paradigm (Wilson 2002), this paper defends the idea that emotional interpersonal relatedness is foundational for the development of higher-order cognitive skills and not the other way around. Given that AI reveal failures in automatic affective processes, such as those involved in creating emotional reciprocity (Hobson 1993, Kasari et al. 1993, Rogers & Pennington 1991), the idea is to argue that embodiment is critically involved in information processing about emotion not only “online”, when people respond to presently observable emotions-bearers, but also “offline”, when people represent the meanings of 2 emotional symbols (Niedenthal et al. 2005). I argue that AI show difficulties in recognizing and understanding emotions because they rely on prototypical representations of emotions and use categorical knowledge to solve novel problems of emotional experiences. But if AI individuals draw on categorical knowledge to interpret offline emotional signals, then, I shall claim, modes of emotional/social relatedness might be primary over modes of cognitive abilities. (Hobson 1993; Mundy & Sigman 1989; Rogers & Pennington 1991)

# J1 Individual Papers

## The Testimony of Emotion

*Elaine O'Connell, University of Sussex, United Kingdom*

I argue that facial expressions of emotion are communicative acts; so, in what might be seen as a slight inversion of Austin’s locutionary performatives, according to which one ‘does something by saying something’ (Austin 1979, p235), I maintain that, when it comes to facial expressions of emotion, one ‘says' something by doing something. We apologise with a smile, we chastise with a stern look and we admit guilt with a blush. In each case, the act has an equivalent utterance; one might just say “sorry” or “don't do that again” or “I know I’ve committed a bit of a faux pas here”. But rather than employ an utterance, an agent can conveyed the same sentiment, non-verbally, by means of a facial expression of emotion. If this is correct, then it may have consequences for the way we think about the attribution of emotional states to others. Knowledge of other minds may be knowledge from testimony rather than inferential knowledge.

## Guiding Action via Emotion: The Rationalising Potential of Emotions

*Mary Carman, King's College London, United Kingdom*

Short abstract: In this paper, I shall argue that emotions can rationalise action. I shall focus on Sabine Doring's argument that "if emotions rationalise action they do so only via the judgements they can non-inferentially justify" (Doring 2007, 387)\cite[387]. Accepting Doring's perceptual account of emotion and that emotions can non-inferentially justify judgements, I shall argue against her conclusion in two ways. First, I shall argue that acting for a reason does not require judging that things are as they appear or making a judgement about what it is that we have most reason to do; it only requires that we could hypothetically endorse such judgements. Second, I shall show how, because emotions involve being committed to the way things appear without regarding the appearance as true, and because they involve seeing things in a way which merits certain responses including a disposition to believe, emotions are compatible with making such hypothetical judgements. In this way, emotions can directly rationalise action.

## Feeling Present in Times Passing: Temporal Awareness and Emotional Acuity

*Thomas Jacobi, University of Basel, Switzerland*

Oftentimes, when people have to confront their own imminent death, a renewed sense of contented alertness seems to infuse their awareness of the world. To us who live life unimpeded, that state of mind can seem puzzling and maybe even enviable. But what might be the reason for such a resetting of one's sensitivities? I want to suggest it is a more refined emotional appreciation of what exists alongside oneself in the flow of time which is quite distinct from the narrative path taken in how we usually approach our life. In fact, this more supple facility seems not unlike our ability of finding meaning in a bare Haiku poem. Perhaps, a more deeply examined life will require such a careful grasp of the minutiae of one's existence.

# J2 Emotions & the Self 2

## Emotion, Perception and the Self in Moral Epistemology

*Michael Lacewing, Heythrop College, United Kingdom*

In this paper, I argue that the currently popular analogy between emotion and perception in metaethics cannot provide the ground for a satisfactory moral epistemology. I note that drawing an analogy between emotions and perception has been highly important and productive in making the case that moral epistemology must find a central place for our sensitivity to the moral salience of particulars – specific events, contexts or properties – and that the values to which we are thus sensitive must be understood in conceptual relation to our emotions. However, that moral values can be known by perception is a further claim. After reviewing the literature to establish the strongest possible case for some kind of emotion-based perceptual intuitionism, I argue that it fails and that the epistemology of our moral sensibilities cannot, in the end, be an epistemology of perceptual experience. I argue that a dispositional model, which places the self and its development at its heart, is required to adequately explain not only how we gain moral knowledge, but also how we fail to gain it, what it is that constitutes ‘getting it right’, and how we establish on any occasion whether we have it right or not.

## Affective Self-Ignorance

*Judit Szalai, Eotvos Lorand University, Hungary*

Philosophical discussions of introspection and the transparency of the mind have rarely engaged an obvious type of mental state regarding which self-knowledge can fail: the emotions. In this paper, I propose to assess modes of affective self-ignorance and its possible implications for philosophical psychology and the philosophy action.

One way in which a subject can be ignorant of her emotion is through the state being nonconscious. While phenomena like subliminal perception and automaticity in visual processing may be more familiar from both philosophical and cognitive psychological literature, psychotherapy has been long relying on the assumption that it is possible to be unaware of our emotions. Perhaps because of association with Freud, philosophy in the English-speaking world has been relatively slow in accommodating the contemporary, profoundly altered view of the nonconscious proposed by cognitive and social psychologists like Timothy D. Wilson, Daniel Gilbert, and John Bargh. From different angles, experimental philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel and political philosopher Daniel Haybron have offered similar suggestions concerning lack of knowledge of our own mental states, also specifically addressing the case of emotions.

Another way in which we can misjudge our emotions is misidentifying their causes, objects, intrinsic properties, and effects on other mental states. It has been observed that the object and the cause of an emotion may come apart, without the subject being aware of this. Fits of anger are often misinterpreted by the person who produces them, in that the properties of the target she identifies as having triggered them are not their actual cause. Emotions and moods may have a distorting effect on cognition and influence action, unbeknownst to their subject.

An especially intriguing facet of affective ignorance is poorly predicting our future emotional states (affective forecasting). As it emerges from a growing body of psychological literature, people exhibit surprising and systematic mistakes in thinking about their own future emotions, affecting our knowledge of the type, duration, as well as the intensity of the emotion.

What kind of further philosophical benefit is to be hoped for from the examination of affective ignorance besides registering the phenomenon in its different manifestations? Ignorance of our affective states seems to have straightforward implications concerning the identification of motives of action and belief-formation. Lack of affective knowledge may have a role in the explanation of a variety of irrational phenomena, including akrasia and self-deception. Being unaware of the emotional factors behind our performing a certain action may lead us to rationalization. The akratic may systematically disregard evidence concerning emotional factors that contribute to her behavior. Similarly, we may be unaware of the emotions that influence us in forming certain beliefs; this may contribute to an excessive measure of doxastic conservatism (resistance to the pressure to give up our views in the light of contrary evidence).

## How to Understand Limit Emotions?

*Karol Chrobak, Warsaw University of Life Sciences, Poland*

The focus of interest of my paper is a particular kind of emotions that could be called “limit emotions” (Grenzemotionen). I am introducing the term following terminology of Helmuth Plessner and Karl Jaspers. Both emphasized significance of experiencing the limits of human behavior (Grenzen des menschlichen Verhaltens) as well as of limit situations (Grenzsituationen) that evoke in us such extreme experiences. Limit emotions denote feelings that appear while a regular way of behavior is blocked and no clear reaction is available.

Since limit emotions arise while no ordinary emotions are adequate, it seems necessary first to explain what the latter are before analyzing the former. Roughly speaking, there are two opposing conceptions of emotions that run through the history of philosophy. First approach could be called “propositional” since it interprets emotions as if they were cognitive attitudes. According to this stance, every emotion can be understood as an expression of a proposition about the world being good or bad, conducive to us or not. Since the Stoics considered every evaluative proposition about the world false, they also rejected experiencing any kind of emotion. Second approach can be characterized as non-propositional since it treats emotions as devoid of any content. Feelings or sentiments are explained in terms of blind and brutish manifestations of our animal nature. There is no sense to ask what an emotion means or what stands behind an emotion since it is only a purely automatic response to a situation. Such an approach has been widely represented within empiricist (D. Hume), positivist (A. J. Ayer) and analytic (Ch. L. Stevenson) tradition. The conception of emotions – I am going to present – makes an attempt to fuse both approaches by locating them within a broader anthropological model. The model – I call “hermeneutical” – conceives of man as a being who relates to the world by means of interpretations. These interpretations work on conscious as well as unconscious level; they are of different origin: some of them are inborn, most of them, however, are formulated by individuals for their private use, by groups for ad hoc occasions, as well as by whole societies for securing social and political cohesion. All such interpretations let us understand the world we live in, and also to orient ourselves within it. Only because of them man is able to consider a situation as favorable to them, or as being an obstacle to achieving their goals. Emotions are psychological reactions to such a situation of the world being in harmony or in disharmony with man’s needs and expectations. Emotion is a way we experience a physiochemical process occurring in our brains. It does not mean, however, that emotional experiences are totally beyond our control. Such a control is possible indirectly through manipulating our interpretations of the world. So, emotions as such do not have much to do with human knowledge, with the way we describe the world. Nevertheless, they are strictly related to human way of representing the world since they are manifesting our needs being satisfied or unsatisfied by external conditions. This model explains the character of emotions that are directed at a particular state of affairs in the world (a person I like, a food I necessary need etc.). All these objects and persons I have my feelings about are elements of my world that I understand according to a particular interpretation scheme. I think, however, that sometimes we encounter situations that we are not able to put into any clear interpretation scheme. This can happen because of at least three different reasons: (a) we are not equipped with any interpretation that could help us to understand a situation, (b) there is more than one possible interpretation of a situation, and we are not able to decide which of them is adequate, (c) the very foundation of any interpretation (me, other people, whole society) has been discredited (deprived of any value, considered untrustworthy). All these limit experiences – where no more interpretation is available – lead to stopping any behavior, any subject-to-world oriented action. However, emotions and feelings are still “responding” to such a strange situation. I call these feelings “limit emotions” since they are reflecting not subject-to-world relation but only the inner-subjective state of disorientation caused by the impossibility of formulating any interpretation. I suppose that each kind of three limit experiences indicated above matches a particular limit emotion. In the case of (a) we are experiencing mostly disorientation, embarrassment, anxiety. In the case of (b) we very often laugh. In the case of (c) we fall into despair.

# J3 Individual Papers

## Intentionality and Feeling in Perceptual Theories of the Emotions

*Tristram Oliver-Skuse, University of Melbourne, Australia*

Christine Tappolet and Sabine Döring claim that emotions have representational content that can figure in justifications. Explaining how this could be so is a live philosophical task. I examine two very different pictures of how emotions get to have representational contents and argue that both fail to give perceptual theorists the resources they need for their account of emotions, and they both fail in the same way.

Jesse Prinz’s account is the first such picture, but it fails to build the proper object of the emotion into its representational content; it says that emotions co-vary with situations exemplifying evaluative properties, that they function to track these properties, and that these two suffice for them representing those properties. But it offers no resources for the attribution of the properties to any particular features of the situation. Prinz does this because his Dretske-inspired account of representation ties representation too closely to detection and so does not easily extend to account for attributive representation. As a result, on this picture, fear represents danger rather than representing the thing I am afraid of as dangerous and so does not give us the right kinds of representations to figure in justifications.

Another strategy starts from the parallel between emotions and perceptions and tries to build an account of emotional representation using a promising account from the philosophy of perception. The account is a Sellarsian two-part theory, which I argue looks promising because it doesn’t require as much from the emotional feelings as many other theories of perception would – most of the representational work is done by the conceptual element. But, I argue, this account also fails to give emotions their proper objects if we take seriously the ideas that a) the feeling must guide the conceptual element of the representation, and b) the intentionality of the whole comes from the conceptual part of the combination, since it is mysterious how the feeling component, thought of as non-intentional, could guide the representation attribution-side of the representation.

I take these two very similar failures from two otherwise very different starting points as evidence, though not conclusive, that any approach that does not start with the intentionality built into the feeling itself will fail. Fortunately for Tappolet and Döring, emotions seem well-suited to being understood as having intentionality built into the feeling of the emotion itself – both because first-person experience presents them this way, and because, unlike perceptions, emotions are not a plausible source of original intentionality, but get their intentionality parasitically via their cognitive bases. Appealing to intentionality to explain the contents of perception looks like a failure to answer the question of how perceptual representation directs us towards the world. By contrast, I can feel fear towards a shark precisely because the shark has been made available to me as a target for fear by my other cognitive abilities, including perception.

## Emotional Feelings are not about what we think they are about

*Kevin Reuter, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany*

Within the field of emotion theory, perceptual (or feeling) theories of emotion (Barlassina, 2013; Goldie, 2002; Prinz, 2004) explicate the intentionality of emotions, i.e. what emotions are about, by drawing an analogy with sensory experiences and bodily states: Whereas sensory experiences are intentional by representing certain states of affairs, emotional feelings also represent the objects, properties and events they are thought to be about. In this paper I present three objections against the perceptual view of emotions by arguing that the intentional structure of sensory experiences is fundamentally different from the intentional structure of emotional states and instead, akin to judgments or thoughts.

Objection 1: Intentional content need not be preserved

According to representational theories of sensory experiences (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995), if a person has an experience of white snow, then he visually represents whiteness. Even if he is distracted from the whiteness for a while, focused attention will immediately make available the intentional content of the visual experience. In contrast, it seems that emotional content need to be preserved. Feinstein et al. (2009) show that emotional experiences sustain even when people have forgotton what they were emotional about. This suggests not only that if emotional feelings have intentional content, then they do not carry their intentional content necessarily, but also that given the supposed analogy with sensory states, emotional experiences may never have independent intentional content.

Objection 2: Indeterminacy of intentionality

Imagine you play a game of Poker on a Friday night. You constantly get terrible cards. Even when you try to bluff your way into the game, your bluff is successfully called by another player. When the cards are dealt once more, you cannot restrain yourself any longer and blurt out, “I am so annoyed by these cards”. In such cases, it seems you could have expressed your emotion in a variety of ways, e.g. “I am so annoyed by the way the game goes tonight”, “I am so annoyed by the bad luck I have got.” I will evaluate these cases to show that contra to representational theories of experiences, there often is no fact of the matter what an emotional feeling is about.

Objection 3: Complex intentionality

When people explicate the putative intentionality of emotional feelings, they usually do so by using very simple examples, e.g. feeling angry about my partner, feeling scared of the dog. However, not only do we think about the partner and dog, proponents of perceptual theories of emotion state that the angry and fearful feelings themselves are about the partner and the dog. However, intentional objects are often far more complicated, e.g. a feeling of delight at making fun of someone’s embarrassment on hearing another person’s somewhat off-colour joke (Goldie, 2002). Using such cases, I will argue that the phenomenality of emotional feelings does not square with the possibility of fine-grained complex intentionality.

## 1st and 3rd Person Knowledge of Emotions

*Katherine Rickus, Marquette University, United States*

An emotion can be unpleasant and we might wish it would dissipate. We might also have an even stronger antipathy or aversion to our particular experiences given what they tell us about ourselves or what they demonstrate to others. It is as a result of such considerations that I suggest there is a second-order phenomenon relevant to emotions, a phenomenon I call permissibility. Which emotions can and do we permit ourselves to have, and to identify in others? This is a matter given little attention in the philosophical literature on self-knowledge and on emotion, given a prevalent assumption that the experiences of emotions are just feelings that arise, and over which we have little control. To focus on what I call "permissibility", I argue, tells us much about the complex and dynamic form of emotions, and about the conditions relevant to emotions by which we come to know ourselves. This paper compares accounts of first- and third-person epistemic authority on emotional states, and describes what provides and what undermines such authority. I focus on first-person authority and argue for its rejection with respect to emotions. Drawing on examples from literature, medicine, and psychiatry, I demonstrate how introspection can come in varying degrees of reliability, and how introspective judgments on emotional states are authoritative only in virtue of the reliability of the mechanism responsible for their production. I propose one way in which knowing emotions can be enhanced, by invoking the idea of "permissibility". The notion of whether a subject "permits" herself to be in a certain emotional state is central to this analysis, and its effect on the timing, quality, intensity and misinterpretation of emotional states is described. Symmetries and asymmetries in the first- and third-person perspectives are considered, and it is noted how third-persons may be subject to errors or other biases in the assessment of a subject's emotional states, and that these distortions undermine the authority of their interpretations of the emotions of others. I find, then, that obtaining knowledge of emotional states from either perspective represents, for the most part, a considerable epistemic accomplishment. I conclude with a short discussion of how, considering the epistemic liabilities noted, improvements in self-knowledge can still be attained through a collaborative second-person perspective.

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# Notes:

1. Amodio and Devine refer to “evaluations” rather than to “feelings,” “affect,” or “prejudice,” although they take these to be synonymous. We do not assume that these are synonymous, but we will not pursue this issue here. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)